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The effectiveness of any military force can be deter-
mined by the capabilities and reliability of its individual
members. This has always been the primary concern for mili-
tary strategists and decision makers. Prediction of human
performance is still a problem for the administrative
science area as well as the military manpower area.
Having such a big armed force, the Soviet Union confronts
manpower problems which can affect overall military effec-
tiveness. This thesis investigates the qualitative and quan-
titative problems of Soviet military manpower. It looks at
Soviet demography, manpower availability, ethnic issues,
training and education. It also attempts to appraise the
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I. INTRODUCTION
"...of themselves, weapons and military equipment do not
determine the success of combat operations. What is impor-
tant is in whose hands they are. We know that man was and
remains the decisive force in war. Neither a missile, nor a
plane, nor a tank. ... nothing is so formidable for the enemy
as a soldier who has high combat morale and military exper-
tise, who is capable of skillfully employing weapons and
equipment and using their combat properties to the full
extent to defeat the enemy and win the victory." [Ref. 1]
A. A. Grechko
Churchill called the Soviet Union 'an enigma wrapped
inside a riddle'. The end of the cold war, detente, and
growth of east west contacts have not significantly dimin-
ished the hazards facing the analyst of the Soviet scene.
[Ref. 2]
This thesis will seek and examine the issues which
affect the fighting capability of today's Soviet soldier,
sailor and airman. Because of the human factors which make
the predictions and statistical inferences difficult (due to
the non availability of statistical data to analyze human
activities in the Soviet Military) a literature survey will
be utilized in this thesis.
It has been said more than once that while we know a
great deal about the manpower composition of uniformed
elements of the Soviet Army, we know little or nothing about
the operations of the Soviet military system at large.
Generalizations about military manpower will not suffice nor
will the transposition of Western terms and Western perspec-
tives into the Soviet scene provide anything like a satis-
factory answer.
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In this thesis, manpower analysis methodology will be
utilized by investigating the economically and bureaucrati-
cally efficient management of a peacetime armed force oper-
ating on a steady-state basis and the combat effectiveness
of that peacetime force during mobilization or war. In other
words the model which is used to analyze Soviet military
manpower will be applied first to the general manpower
issues and then to the questions of readiness and combat
effectiveness
.
A. IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN FACTOR IN ASSESING MILITARY
CAPABILITIES
As long as wars remain possible, military forces will
exist. Military forces can be defined as the protective
mechanisms of an organic existence called the "state."
Military capabilities are one of the many capabilities which
are possesed by the state. They constitute a synthesis of
quantitative and qualitative many factors, ranging from
available weapons, to the personnel who use them.
The true test of military capabilities is combat readi-
ness. Combat is keystone determinant of any war. Any means
of war is implemented to accomplish combat missions. The
accomplishments of combat missions lead a military force to
the victory which is the overall objective of military
strategy
.
In the book Basic Principles of Operational Arts and
Tactics
,
the author ,Vasilii Savkin deals with the concept of
combat effectiveness as following:
In the course of an operation or battle the combat
effectiveness of troops must be constantly maintained at
the level which ensures successful accomplishment of
assigned combat missions. And he continues, As we know,
the combat effectiveness of troops is understood to mean
the capability of troops to conduct decisive combat
operations and fully accomplish the combat mission to
destroy the enemy under any conditions. Preservation of
combat effectiveness is a most important principle of
operational art and tactics which ensures the attain-
ment of victory in a battle or operation. If it is
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violated it is practically inconceivable to apply all
other principles of operational art and tactics, inas-
much as troops who have lost combat effectiveness cannot
conduct successful combat operations. [Ref. 3 J
The word readiness is fraught with conceptual and defi-
nitional problems. Meaningful measurement of the elusive
quality of readiness is equally difficult. For many strate-
gists and military analysts, the word "readiness" implies
the capability, with a degree of confidence, of winning any
war, fought any place at any time. If a military force
cannot respond to a threat, it is not combat ready.
Readiness is a function of many variables, including
resources. These must be configured and allocated in such a
way to maximize the probability that operational require-
ments will be met. Numerous manpower and training configura-
tions to accomplish a particular end are possible by
alternate manning mixes and quality levels, specific
personnel policies, length and type of training, job designs
and team composition. Relationships among variables must be
understood in order to make choices of the optimal
configurations. [Ref. 4]
Readiness is unpredictable and it is difficult to deter-
mine its elements. The quality of a nation's military
manpower is most difficult to evaluate and predict
.
Military history is full of many interesting and surprising
examples of the misunderstandings and misevaluat ions of this
factor and many defeats as the consequences of this.
To a significant degree military manpower analysts
confront methodology problems. One question to ask is
whether the military manpower analyst is interested in
investigating (1) the economically and bureaucratically
efficient management of a peacetime armed force operating
on a steady state basis or (2) the combat effectiveness of
that peacetime force during mobilization or war.
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Before beginning his work, a manpower analyst should
take into consideration the following questions.
1. Is he interested in peacetime efficiency of a stable
force?
2. Is he interested in the relationship of peacetime
manpower policies to warfighting capability?
3. Is he interested in the immediate combat readiness
and effectiveness of forces in being?
4. Is he interested in mobilization potential of this
nation?
This thesis will seek the answers to these four ques-
tions. The first question will be dealt by examining the
current structure of Soviet Armed Forces and the manpower
pool which supplies armed forces and civilian labor force.
Also, the military management and administration in terms of
military manpower issues will be examined.
The second question is primarily related with the
training, education and indoctrination of Soviet military
manpower. This question is also function of personnel poli-
cies like recruitment, selection, placement, promotion and
compensation. The peacetime manpower policies are the inputs
of warfighting capabilites. The objectives of training and
education are to prepare the men to fight. Any change of
these peacetime training and education policies will affect
the potential warfighting capabilities.
The third question addresses "how well the Soviet
soldier does as a professional" and "what are his weak and
strong points in terms of his potential combat readiness."
Although it is very difficult to evaluate combat readiness,
this thesis will consider evidence relating to the Soviet
soldier's morale, psychology, physical strength, patriotism,
initiative, motivation to fight, and leadership, these being
potential determinants of immediate readiness and effective-
ness of forces in being.
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The fourth question will prompt the manpower analyst to
analyze the overall mobilization capability of the Soviet
Union in case of a total war. Here, the analyses of past
events and Soviet version of mobilization process and civil
defense will be the main themes. The methodologic flowchart
of this thesis is shown in Figure 1.1.
In order to answers above questions, data obtained
mainly from following sources will be used and analyzed:
1. Writings of western experts on Soviet military
manpower.
2. Writings of Soviet military experts on general mili-
tary issues
.
3. Translations of Soviet newspapers and periodicals.
4. Western newspapers and periodicals.
5. The final reports of western seminars and conferences
on Soviet military manpower and relevant issues.
6. Reports of civilian and military institutions of
strategic research and analysis.
The manpower analyst is also encouraged to keep his eyes on
the intangible disciplines of history, and philosophy, as
well as the more concrete ones of management, administra-
tion, and economics/ finance . In dealing with human--as
opposed to material -- factors, a predisposition for the
humanities is useful, to assist in understanding the
unpredictabilitiy , seeming irrationality, and frequently
emotional roots of how a country raises and uses its armed
forces. [Ref. 5]
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Figure 1.1 Flowchart of the Thesis Methodology
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B. BACKGROUND ON SOVIET MILITARY FORCES
The Soviet Union has five major services which include,
the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces, The National
Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces, and the Navy.
Additionally, there are the Rear Services which are Border
Guards, Internal Security Guards, Railroad and Construction
Troops , and Command and General Support Troops
.
The current structure of the Soviet Armed Forces has
slowly evolved since the end of World War II. The revolution
in military affairs that began in the 1950s "evoked changes"
in the organizational structure, in the correlation of the
services of the Armed Forces , and of the branches of
service. One direct result was the formation of a fifth
service in 1959, the Strategic Rocket Forces. At the
present time the armed forces of the majority of states are
divided into services; ground forces, air force, and naval
forces. In the Soviet Union, the Strategic Rocket Forces
and the Troops of National PVO ( Protivovozdushnoy Voyska
Oborony- National Air Defense) are also separate services
of the armed forces. [Ref. 6]
The five services --Ground Forces, Strategic Rocket
Forces, Air Forces, Troops of National Air Defense, and
Navy-- are directly under the control of the Ministry of
Defense, as are the Troops of the Tyl (Rear Services), and
the Troops of Civil Defense. Border Troops, however
,
are
under the Committee of State Security (KGB), and the
Internal Troops come under the Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MVD). It is almost impossible to compare the Armed Forces
of the Soviet Union with any other country's Armed Forces.
Each of five services, with the exception of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, is made up of different arms of service. As
will be shown below, in the Ground Forces there are seven,
in the Air Defense Forces three, in the Air Forces three,
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and in the Navy six different arms of services. The
Airborne Forces constitute a separate arm of service, which
is not part of the complement of any of the main Services.
1. The Strategic Rocket Forces
This is the newest and the smallest force of the
five Armed Services. It is also the most important component
of the Armed Forces from an overall strategic nuclear capa-
bilities perspective. Therefore, it is mentioned first in
Soviet references. The SRF was established as an independent
Service in 1959. At its head is a Commander-in-Chief with
the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Under his Command
are three Rocket Armies, three independent Rocket Corps, ten
to twelve Rocket Divisions, three sizeable rocket ranges and
a large number of scientific research and teaching
establishments. [Ref. 7]
The total strength of the SRF is about 322,000
active personnel, 51,000 civilian personnel, and 616,000
reserve personnel (total 989,000). [Ref. 8]
The SRF is both an operational and an administrative
organization. In peacetime its Commander-in-Chief is
responsible to the Minister of Defense on all administrative
questions and to the Politburo on all aspects of the opera-
tional use of rockets. In wartime the SRF would be
controlled by the Defense Council, through the Supreme
Commander. A final decision on the mass use of strategic
rockets would be made by the Defense Council.
Military personnel to be drawn to the SRF are highly
trained and educated. Approximately 100 percent of the SRF
personnel are specialized l due to the nature of their jobs
and 66 percent of the overall missile personnel are first
! There are three different class ratings for special-
ties. Personnel in each of five services are under strong
pressure to move from a third class to a second class anc
then to first class specialist rating.
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and second class specialists. Additionally more than half of
the personnel have a second specialty.
2. The Ground Forces
The Ground Forces are the oldest, the largest, and
the most diversified of the services making up the Armed
Forces of the Red Army. In peacetime their strength totals
approximately 2,840,000 active personnel, 305,000 civilian
personnel, 5,091,000 reserve personnel, but mobilization
would bring them up to between 21 and 23 million within ten
days. They contain seven arms of services: [Ref. 9]
These include: (1) Motor-rifle Troops; (2) Tank
Troops; (3) Artillery and Rocket Troops of the Ground
Forces; (4) Air Defense Forces of the Ground Forces; (5)
Airborne Assault Troops; (6) Diversionary Troops (Spetsnaz);
and (7) Fortified Area Troops.
Personnel of the Ground Forces are relatively less
educated and their class ratings are lower, comparing to the
other services. In Soviet Armed Forces, there are 2,000
different specialties with the Ground Forces having the
smallest number of specialities of any of the services.
Most skilled and capable personnel within the Ground Forces
are assigned to the troops where high-tech missile systems
or sophisticated tanks and artillery systems are in use.
In the less technical services like Ground Forces,
the percentage of highly skilled personnel is not high but
it still must be sizable, since at any one time at least
three quarters of the ground forces have been in the Army
for six months or more and consequently should have
acquired at least a third class specialist rating.
[Ref. 10]
In their organization and operational strength, the
Ground Forces can be seen as a scaled-down model of the
entire Soviet Armed Forces. The Ground Forces have their
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own rocket troops, their own air defense troops, their own
aircraft, which are independent of the Air Forces, and their
own airborne troops which are the second strongest in the
world
.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces has no
more than an administrative function. His headquarters
contains neither an Operational nor an Intelligence
Directorate. All operational planning is carried out by the
mixed commands of the Fronts, Strategic Directions or
General Staff. The Commander-in-Chief's responsibilities
are limited to the equipment, provisioning and training of
his forces. However, despite the fact that he has no
responsibility for the direction of operations, the C-in-C
Ground Forces is still a highly influential administrator.
Clearly, anyone who is responsible for the development and
supply of 41 Armies, including 8 Tank Armies deserves
respect. The Commanders of the various arms of service of
the Ground Forces, too, have purely administrative functions.
The direction of operations, as we already know, is the
function of mixed all arms commands, which are not subordi-
nated for this function to either the C-in-C or the
Commanders of individual arms of service. [Ref. 11]
3 . The National Air Defense Forces
The National Air Defense Forces (ADF) are the third
most important of the five Services , after the Strategic
Rocket Forces and Ground Forces. In peacetime, they consist
of 494,000 active personnel, 65,000 civilian personnel, and
1,015,000 reserve personnel. [Ref. 12]
The overall quality of the ADF is relatively high
and the number of people who have first and second class
specialties is higher than most other branches of the armed
forces. 95 percent of ADF troops' personnel are qualified
specialists and most of them hold a second specialty rating.
[Ref. 13]
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Because they form a unified combat organization,
the ADF are always commanded by a Marshal of the Soviet
Union. The Ground Forces which are five times the size of
the ADF, and which represent the striking force of the
Soviet Union in Europe, are headed only by a General of the
Army. In the Armed Forces of any other country, responsi-
bility for air defense is laid upon its air forces. In the
Soviet Union, the air defense system was so highly developed
that it would be quite impossible to confine it within the
organizational structure of the Air Forces. The independence
of the ADF from the Air Forces is due not only to their size
and to their technical development, but also to the overall
Soviet philosophy concerning the allocation of wartime
roles. In any country in which Soviet specialists are given
the the task of setting up or restructuring the Armed
Forces, they establish several parallel systems of air
defense. One is a static system, designed to defend the
territory of the country and the most important administra-
tive, political, economic and transport installations which
it contains. This is a copy of the ADF. In addition, sepa-
rate systems for self defense and protection against air
attack are set up in the Ground Forces , the Navy and the Air
Forces. While the national defense system is static, those
of the different armed services are mobile, designed to
move alongside the forces which they exist to protect. If
several systems find themselves operating in the same area,
they work with one another and in such a case their collabo-





The Air Forces are the fourth most important of the
Armed Services. There are two reasons for this low rating.
In the first place, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces
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does not control all aircraft. Those of the Air Defense
Forces are completely independent of the Air Forces. Those
of the Navy, which include the most modern bombers, also
have no link with the Air Forces. The Airborne Assault
Troops, as an integral part of the Ground Forces, have
nothing to do with the Air Forces either. Secondly, unlike
the Commanders-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces and
the Air Defense Forces, the C-in-C of the Air Forces is not
an operational commander but an administrator. Subordinated
to the C-in-C of the Air Forces in peacetime are: (1)
Sixteen Air Armies; (2) The Commander of the Long-Range Air
Force; (3) The Commander of Military Transport Aviation; and
(4) The Training centers, Research Establishments, Test
centers
.
The total peacetime strength of the Air Forces is
530,000 active personnel, 158,000 civilian personnel, and
830,000 reserve personnel. [Ref. 15]
However, the apparent strength of the C-in-C of the
Air Forces is illusory. He is responsible for all questions
concerning the functioning of the Air Forces, from the
development of new aircraft to the training of cosmonauts,
but he is in no way involved in questions concerning the
operational use of the aircraft under his command. In
wartime all sixteen Air Armies become integral components of
the fronts. Each front has an Air Army, which it uses as it
considers necessary. Only the highest operational commanders
--the C-in-C of a Strategic Direction or the Supreme
Commander-- may interfere in a front's operational planning
problems (including those of the Air Army belonging to it).
The C-in-C of the Air Forces may only advise the Supreme
Commander if his advice sought; if not, his task is solely to
ensure that the Air Armies receive all the supplies they
need to carry out their operations. Nor is the Long Range
Air Force operationally controlled by the C-in-C of the Air
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Forces. It is subordinated exclusively to the Supreme
Commander, who can either make use of its entire strength
or allocate part of it, temporarily, to the C-in-C of
Strategic Directions. [Ref. 16]
In the Air Force, more than 80 percent of the
personnel are first and second class personnel and almost
all flight personnel have had engineering training.
[Ref. 17]
5 . The Navy
The Soviet Navy has four Fleets: Northern, Pacific,
Baltic and Black Sea, in order of strength.
Each of the four fleets has six arms of Services.
These are (1) Submarines; (2) Naval Aviation; (3) Surface
Ships; (4) Diversionary SPETSNAZ naval sub-units; (5)
Coastal Rocket and Artillery Troops; and (6) Marine
Infantry
.
The first two of these are considered the primary
arms of service; the remainder, including surface ships, are
seen as auxiliary forces. The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy
has a purely administrative function. In addition to his
administrative function, however, the C-in-C of the Navy is
the Stavka's (High Command's) main advisor on the opera-
tional use of the Navy. In certain situations, too, on the
instructions from the Stavka, he may direct groups of ships
operating in the open sea. But he has no independent opera-
tional planning function; this is entirely the responsi-
bility of the General Staff. [Ref. 18]
Ninety percent of the naval personnel are highly
technical and well educated. Especially in the nuclear
submarines, personnel are under great pressure to develop
first class qualifications. Also, one third of the crew of a
nuclear submarine are first class specialists with another
second class specialty.
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The total manpower strength of the Navy include,
442,000 active personnel, 111,000 civilian personnel, and
663,000 reserve personnel. [Ref. 19]
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II. MANPOWER POOL
Covering about 14 percent of the earth's land area, the
USSR is the world's largest nation and ranks third in popu-
lation. Its four geo-demographic regions which include
Slavic, Baltic, Transcaucasus , and Central Asian comprise 15
constituent or Union Republics. European USSR includes
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussia, the Ukraine, the
Moldavian SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic), Georgia, the
Armenian SSR, the Adzerbaidzhan SSR, and Russian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic. Central Asian USSR includes
the Turkmen SSR, Kazakh SSR, Uzbekh SSR, Tadzhik SSR and
Kirghiz SSR. These republics and their populations are shown
in Figure II and Table I.
The USSR is the last of the great multinational empires.
Within its borders live approximately 271 million (as of
1983) inhabitants of whom about half are non-Russians. These
non-Russians come from more than one hundred distinct
nationalities, nearly one hundred of whom employ their own
distinct languages. Religiously and culturally, non-Russians
are equally diverse, embracing Eastern Orthodoxy, Eastern
Catholicism, Catholicism, Lutheranism, Sunnite and Shiite
Islam, Judaism, Ismailis (Nazarit), Armenian Gregorians
,
Buddhists, Buddhist-Lamaites , Nestorian Christians, and
animists. [Ref. 20]
Obviously, the cohort from which Soviet military
manpower requirements must be drawn reflects this diver-
sity;it is not homogeneously Slavic, let alone Russian,
mass. Yet, for historical reasons, Russians and Soviet mili-
tary planners alike have relied primarily on Russian and
other Slavic peoples to man and staff both pre and post- 1917
Armed Forces. For centuries this policy has proved
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sufficient, as the number of available Slavs and the few
trusted others have been greater than military manpower
demand. But this favorable situation is changing rapidly.
The USSR faces current and increasing labor imbalances
and shortages. For Soviet manpower planners, the labor
picture is complicated by the rapidly changing ethnic makeup
of the available and future military and nonmilitary labor
cohort. From 1980 to 1995, the number of Soviet males who
become 18 years old each year will vary between approxi-
mately 2.1 and 2.4 million. This cohort must supply both
military and nonmilitary labor requirements. There are
5,050,000 people serving actively in the Soviet Armed
Forces, only by conservative estimate. The conscripts have
the 69 percent share of the overall size which comprise
3,484,500 people while the officers and Enlisted cadre
personnel have the shares of 20 percent and 10 percent
respectively. The military alone requires approximately 1.7
million new 18-year-old male conscripts each year given
current Soviet force size. It is unknown how many young
males Soviet planners deem necessary for the needs of the
economy. Nevertheless, assuming no change in the conscrip-
tion law or terms of service, or in labor productivity, an
annual military requirement of 70 to 80 percent of the 18
-year-old male cohort implies that relatively inadequate
numbers will become available for civilian purposes.
[Ref. 21]
Assuming 2 or 3 years of active service life for 1.7
million cohort in a given year, 3.4 million draftees will
be in service which include two annual cohorts. That is, two
times 1.7 million manpower supply will be in the active
service. The rest of this 18-21 year-old age group is avail-
able for civilian purposes that might not be adequate for
the manpower requirements deemed necessary to man the
civilian jobs with this age group.
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Labor shortages take on a very important role in the
Soviet economy because of inability to improve productivity
and increased labor utilization has been traditionally
relied upon to improve economic growth. Efforts toward
more efficient utilization of labor failed throughout the
1970's, despite substantial access to Western technology.
Productivity growth fell from 0.8 percent per year in the
1960's to percent in the period 1971-1974 and -0.4 percent
in the latter 1970' s. Indicators for 1979 also show that
more recent efforts to increase productivity have failed
to achieve substantial gains. With these considerations in
mind, maintenance of an adequate labor force becomes abso-
lutely crucial to the future of the Soviet economy.
[Ref. 22]
In addition to the economic impacts, the scarcity of
manpower resources may have adverse affects on the size of
the Armed Forces for there should be intense competition
between the military and economic sectors for the shrinking
cohort of 18-year-old males. Thus, quantitative manpower
issues facing the Soviet Union are immense. But the real
difficulties lie not so much in the quantitative avail-
ability of manpower as in the regional distribution of
human resources. The projections of both U.S. and Soviet
demographers indicate that the increase in the able-bodied
age cohorts in Central Asia and Kazakhstan will actually
exceed that for the USSR as a whole during the 1980' s,
while the industrially developed RSFSR will suffer a net
decrease in labor force additions. The situation will be
essentially the same for the Ukraine and the Baltic
Republics. [Ref. 23]
General Soviet Population increased 0.083 percent
between 1922 and 1982. As it will be seen in Table I, the
maximum natural increase has occured in Central Asian
Republics. Within this group there is no increase ratio less
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than 2 percent only except Kazakhstan (%1.63). Second group
with greater increase ratio is Transcaucasus which has no
less than 1 percent increase ratio, except Georgia (%0.96).
Slavic and Baltic republics had an increase ratio of less
than 1 percent of which most are under the 0.50 percent. All
these numbers dictate that the Russians have not been repro-
ducing themselves as rapidly as non-Russians have. Since,
Russian population now comprise only slightly over 52
percent of total Soviet population, they will be outnumbered
by non-Russian ethnic groups in the foreseeable future if
present trend continues.
A. DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF SOVIET UNION
For the purpose of demographic analysis, the nationali-
ties of the Soviet Union may be roughly divided into two
groups. The first group is the European nationalities which
consist of the people who live in RSFSR, the Ukraine,
Belorussia, and the Baltic Republics and, to a lesser degree
Moldavia. The second group is the Turco-Moslem or
non-Europeans nationalities of Central Asia* and
Transcaucasus Republics. The regional distribution of the
various nationalities, the current and projected patterns
of migration, the birthrate disparities, and the degree of
cultural/ linguistic assimilation of the non-Slavic elements
combine to portray the image of a rapidly changing society
of a multi-ethnic character. [Ref. 24]
As it is shown in table I, the 1979 population of 15
Republics and their composition as of Russians and
non-Russians give a clear picture of the structure of the
current population. In this table, Republics are divided
into 5 major geographical areas which consist Slavic,
Baltic, Transcaucasus, Central Asia and Moldavia.
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Over the total population of USSR, Slavic portion is 75
percent (includes 11 percent other nationalities living in
Slavic Republics) while Baltic, Transcaucasus , Central
Asian, and Moldavian portions are 2 percent, 5 percent, 15
percent, and 1,5 percent respectively. Russian population is
highest in Slavic Republics with 63 percent share and lowest
in Transcaucasus with 6 percent share. Indigenous Nominal
ethnic groups constitute the majority of population and
their percentage shares are between 36 percent minimum as in
Kazakh SSR, and 90 percent maximum as in Armenian SSR.
Obviously, the Russian population is highest in RSFSR with a
82 percent share and lowest with a 2 percent share in
Armenia SSR.
The ethnodemographic composition of the USSR is charac-
terized by a large disparity between the growth rates of the
country's "European" (Slavic and Baltic) nationalities,
which are low and have steadily fallen, and the growth rates
of its "non-European" (Caucasian and Central Asian) nation-
alities, which are extremely high. However the European
nationalities form such a large majority of the population,
overall Soviet population growth has slowed to 0.8 percent
annum, while the proportion of "non-Europeans" in the popu-
lation has risen from 15.5 percent in 1959 to 21 percent in
1979 and is steadily increasing. That the regime is seri-
ously concerned about this situation is indicated by a
variety of official statements and actions. However,
current trends cannot possibly be stopped or reversed on
short notice, and the spectre of a demographic "yellowing"
that haunts many Soviet "Europeans" will become an increas-
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In many respects, the demographic status of the Soviet
Union is remarkably similar to that of the United States and
Western Europe; while in other respects, the Soviet popula-
tion is unique among the populations of the world. To under-
stand fully the structure and activity of Soviet population
and population growth, it becomes necessary to study both
the impact of historical events and the operation of the
various socio-economic variables which determine present and
future growth. [Ref. 26]
The Russian Empire started the 20th. century with a well
balanced population. This balance was distorted by the
impacts of World War I, the Civil War, famine of the 1920' s,
the pre-war collectivization, the purges of the late 1930's,
and the heavy losses of World War II. It has been estimated
that in the period 1914 to 1921 alone, the total of severe
population losses inflicted upon the Soviet Union through
war, revolution, emigration, and famine was 26 million. Most
noticeable is the absolute decline in population as a result
of World War II, which occured in spite of substantial
territorial expansion that tended to reduce somewhat the
demographic impact of the loss of 7 million soldiers and 13
millions civilians. The 1950-1959 period was characterized
in the Soviet Union, as in Western industrialized nations,
by an uncharacteristic rise in the birth rate and strong
demographic growth. In many respects, the census results for
1970 were shocking to the Soviet leadership. The census
indicated a clear reversal in the earlier trends toward
rapid population growth and Russian demographic strength,
touching off a national debate on regional economic and
nationality policies which is still active at the current
time. The gravest concerns were the apparent decline in the
rate of birth and natural increase of the population and
the clear trend toward massive regional disparities unfavo-
rable to the Slavic nationalities. It also became apparent
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that these trends would accelerate, forecasting serious
dislocations in the decades ahead. These trends, combined
with the presence of emerging cultural and nationalistic
sentiments, carry important consequences for the maintenance
of future economic and military strength. [Ref. 27]
A glance at the map (Figure 2.1), will indicate the
geographical disposition of the constituent republics and
thus the principal area of residence of the ethnic groups
for which they are named. The vast Russian Republic domi-
nates the map, stretching from the Western reaches of the
Soviet Union to the Pacific and from the Arctic Ocean to
much of China and Mongolia on the South. Surrounding the
Russian Republic and forming the Soviet Union's frontiers
with Europe (except Finland), Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and
portions of China are the other 14 constituent republics. In
the northwest are the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithunian SSRs
.
Part of the Lithuanian republic along with all of the
Belorussian and part of the Ukrainian Republic front on
Poland, while the Ukrainian Republic and the Moldavian SSR
provide the Soviet Union's frontiers with Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Romania. In the southwest the Transcaucasian
republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azarbaidzhan from the
borders with Turkey and a part of Iran. In Central Asia the
Turkmen, Uzbek, and Tadzhik republics face the remainder of
Iran and Afghanistan, while part of Tadzhik SSR, the Kirgiz
SSR, and the Kazakh SSR form the Soviet frontiers with
northwestern China.
The religious heritage of the peoples of the various
republics is diverse. Most Russians, Eastern Ukrainians,
Belorussians , and Georgians are Catholic, mainly Eastern
Orthodox. The Western Ukrainians are of Eastern Catholic
persuasion. The Estonians and Latvians are Lutheran for the
most part, while the Lithuanians are Catholic. The Armenians
are Armenian Gregorian. Inhabiting the southern border
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republics from Azerbaidzhan on the west, through the
Central Asian republics, and to the Eastern reaches of
Kazakhstan are millions of Muslims, mostly Sunnis . For
various reasons, including ill-treatment and repression of
its Muslim minorities for years and the complex network of
political and religious hostilities in the Islamic world on
its southern frontiers, the Kremlin must regard with some
concern the rapidly increasing numbers of Muslim-Turkic
peoples inhabiting its southern regions. It is from these
areas that substantial and growing proportions of accessions
















B. MANPOWER AVAILABILITY AND DISTRIBUTION
The Soviet Union's population growth rate slowed from
1.34 percent annually between 1959 and 1970 to 0.92 percent
per year between 1970 and 1979-as previously stated, the
natural increase rate between 1922 and 1982 is 0.83
percent- the rates for ethnic Russians in these two time
periods were 1.12 percent and 0.70 percent, respectively.
Although growth rates for non-Russian peoples, including
Slavs in the Ukrainie and Belorussia, also were lower in the
second period than in the first, the growth rates for
Muslim-Turkic peoples rose relative to the rate for the USSR
as a whole. These differentials mean that the Russian share
of the Soviet Union's population fell from 54.6 percent in
1959 to 52.4 percent in 1979, whereas that of Muslim-Turkic
peoples rose from 12.6 percent in 1959 to 17.4 percent in
1979, and there are now about 46 million of them. Russians
lost in relative strength in their own republic (the RSFSR)
,
in the Transcaucasus , and in Central Asia, but gained in the
Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic republics. In the
Ukraine, Belorussia and Baltic republics indigenous ethnic
groups have lost ground in their homelands and in the USSR
as a whole. Elsewhere, and particularly in the Central Asian
Republics, indigenous ethnic groups have gained, relatively,
in their homelands and in their percentages of the total
population of the Soviet Union. Projections of the total
population and of the numbers of draft age males
,
by ethnic
group, to 1995 were made by the development and application
of simple regression equations. The results show that:(l)
The estimated total number of 18-year-old males becoming
available annually will decline from about 2.39 million in
1980 to about 2.15 million in 1985, and then rise to approxi-
mately 2.31 million in 1995; (2) the Muslim-Turkic group is
the only one which will gain in its share of the total
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population of the USSR during this period; (3) it is the
only group in which the percentages of all Soviet draft-age
males will increase, from about 23.5 percent in 1980 to
about 28.7 percent in 1995; and (4) ethnic Russians now
appear to comprise less than half (49 percent) of the draft-
age male cohort, and by 1995 will comprise about 46 percent
of the total. [Ref. 29]
The projections indicate that the increase in the able-
bodied ages in Central Asia and Kazakhstan will actually
exceed that for the USSR as a whole during the 1980' s. The
Transcaucasus also will supply a positive increment to the
net growth over the entire period. A net decrease will
occur in the RSFSR and the Ukraine beginning in 1980 and
in the Baltic region after 1990. Although there will be a
reduction in the share of the Central Asian region and
Kazakhstan during the 1990' s, and that of the Transcaucasus
will decline from 1985 onward, the contribution of these
areas to the national increase in the able-bodied popula-
tion will continue to be much higher throughout the latter
part of the century than it was during the 1970' s. These
prospects pose serious problems relating to mobility, the
ability to speak Russian, urbanization, and industrializa-
tion process. [Ref. 30]
Despite the fact that the Soviet Union desperately needs
to improve agriculture and to increase sharply the produc-
tivity of farmers through additional inputs of labor as well
as capital, as of January 1,1968, they have lowered the
pension age for collective farmers to that for workers and
employees in the state sector. As of April 1, 1975, they
have lowered the pension age for female farm machine opera-
tors even more in an effort to make work more attractive to
them. Thus, the authorities appear to have a fundamental
ambivalence in their treatment of collective farm workers.
In all, then, the demographic picture forbodes ill for the
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future labor supply until the end of the century. Not only
will the increase in the total numbers be constricting, but
the picture afforded by examination of the regional compo-
nents underscores the necessity for improvements in produc-
tivity and efficiency if past or current economic growth
paths are to be followed in the future. [Ref. 31]
C. ETHNIC CONFLICTS •
The Soviet Armed Forces, which traditionally have drawn
most heavily from the Slavic populations of the Soviet state
to man positions of authority, technological sophistication,
and political sensitivity, now are beginning to be faced
with the specter of a conscription cohort that increasingly
must be drawn from the southern and eastern reaches of the
Soviet Union, particularly from Soviet Turkic-Muslim popula-
tions. By 1995, between one-in-three and one-in-four
members of the draftable cohort will come from a Muslim
region of the USSR. [Ref. 32]
Non-Slavic conscripts constitute approximately 20
percent of combat units, although usually they are relegated
to serving in support capacities. Non-Slavs make up as much
as 80 percent of the construction forces, and the Central
Asians are heavily overrepresented in these units. High
technology services , such as the Strategic Rocket Forces and
the Air Forces, are manned largely by Slavs- - approximately
90-95 percent, of whom the large majority are Russian.
Internal Security Forces are reported to contain a signifi-
cant percentage of Central Asians, who serve as security
guards and in general policing roles. Non-commissioned
officer ranks are filled primarily by Slavs, with Eastern
Ukrainians constituting a sizeable share, perhaps as high
as 60 percent. The Soviet Officer Corps is overwhelmingly
Slavic --approximately 95 percent-- of whom Russians are a
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strong majority. Pre- induction training for non-Slavs is
limited; the voyenkomat (local draft board) system is not
observed to function as an important training instrument.
Russian is the language of command. All written and verbal
instruction is in Russian, non-Russian literature is
discouraged, and punishment is approved for those who cannot
or will not learn Russian. After approximately one year of
service, non-Russian speaking conscripts acquire the ability
to function at a basic level in Russian --"kitchen
Russian"-- but dissimulation is widespread and hard to
control. Fluency in Russian is required in high technology
services, which limits the number of non- Slavs who can
qualify for these duties. [Ref. 33]
The language deficiency contributes the ethnic problems
to a great extent. Superior/ junior relations and military
discipline also suffer from this problem. 2
It is hardly to be expected that ethnic divisions and
anti-Russian sentiments that create major problems in the
civil society are without a similar effect in the military
forces. Naturally Soviet military writers refer only
discreetly to tensions within the multinational units among
which Soviet minorities are dispersed, but the need of
commanders and political workers to "rally the military




Russian knowledge in this nonfluent category. Since Russian
is the sole written and spoken language permitted in
instruction and command in the armed services, one can
anticipate that problems must arise, both in training and in
operations, from the failure of a substantial numbers of
recruits to have an adequate knowledge of Russian. And,
indeed Soviet military writings reflect substantial language
problems that have led the military to push for increased
Russian instruction in the schools of the minority republics
and to institute special classes in the army. These
attempts to alleviate the military's language problems
almost necessarily aggravate problems that derive from
nationalist sentiments, whose strength is evidenced by the
persistence with which most minorities have clung to their
native languages and resist the introduction of Russian as
the language of instruction in their schools.
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collectives" explicitly refers to overcoming national divi-
sions. Military collectives contain representatives of many
nationalities, usually ten to fifteen in company size units,
and "the slightest hostility" among them can impair combat
readiness. Propagandists are told that friendship among men
of different nationalities can be strengthened by implanting
a "burning hatred" of the enemies of the motherland and by
inculcating a pan-national Soviet pride. It is hardly likely
that this will dissolve nationalist feeling or anti-Russian
sentiments. [Ref. 34]
1. Military Participation of the Ethnic Groups
From the founding of the modern Russian state,
non-Russians served voluntarily in auxiliary or allied
forces. The first such troops came from the Kasimov Tatars,
Siberial Tatars, and Nogay Tatars. Having proved effective
and helpful in these cases, the military employment of
non-Russians in nationally segregated units became a stan-
dard practice, which survived the demise of the Russian
Empire and continued under the Soviet regime. Even when the
Russian regime instituted a modern conscription policy in
1699-1700, most non-Russians in military service continued
to serve as volunteers outside the framework of the regular
army in units designated as "Troops of different nationali-
ties". The draft was only applied in Russian areas, appar-
ently to restrict the number of minorities in the army and
thus ensure Russian control. The compulsory service policy
remained focused primarily on the Russian population through
the eighteenth century, although select nationalities gradu-
ally were made subject to the draft. As part of a set of
military reforms adopted in 1874, the "troops of different
nationalities" were disbanded, and conscription, officially,
was made universal.
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In practice, however the Imperial recruitment policy
toward non-Slavs continued to be bifurcated: ethnic groups
considered loyal to the Tsarist regime were drafted, whereas
unreliable elements were excluded from service in the
regular army. In particular, Caucasians, North Caucasians,
and Central Asians were either exempted or excused from
military service at this time. This practice was in
conformity with the regime's stipulation that the ethnic
composition of the annual recruit cohort and of existing
military units be no less than 75 percent Slavic. The regime
raised some volunteer units among the north Caucasian
nationalities, and Caucasians were eventually conscripted,
but Central Asians continued to be exempt until 1916, when
the regime's ill-fortune in World War I forced it to attempt
to draft them. As the drafting of Central Asians indicated,
Imperial conscription policies followed up to that time were
inadequate to provide the numbers of men required by the
magnitude of the struggle in which the regime was engaged in
World War I. In another departure in its recruitment policy,
the leadership encouraged the creation of some national
units, in order to capitalize on the hostility of various
nationalities of the Empire toward the Central powers. But
the efforts of the government proved inadequate to augment
Slavic manpower deployed on the Eastern Front. [Ref. 35]
In the fluid period of the Civil War, before the
Bolsheviks were able to consolidate control, many nationali-
ties formed their own military units and struggled to
achieve different degrees of independence from the new
regime. Such units variously sided with the Reds or the
Whites, depending on which appeared to offer the ethnic
minorities the greatest opportunity for achievement of their
own national aspirations. Whereas some white leaders appar-
ently made little attempt to conceal their Russian
chauvinism and status quo ante intentions, the Bolsheviks
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proclaimed a novel ideology that promised national self
determination . As a result of such factors, the Reds were
more successful in garnering minority allies in their
struggle to defeat the Whites, and even obtained the cooper-
ation of some minority units in subjugating their own home-
lands. The involvement of minority units with the Red Army
made its drive into their regions somewhat more palatable to
the natives. The Bolsheviks' campaign to recruit minorities
was most successful among Central Asians. They created a
Central Asian Commissariat, which was directed and staffed
by locals, to recruit muslim nationalities into a Red
Muslim Army. This army swelled with volunteers who had
defected from the White side and drew in many others. Its
size as an independent entity is not known, for the
Bolsheviks quickly integrated these units into the regular
Red Army. By early 1919 possibly between 225,000 and 250,000
Muslims served in the Red Army under native officers.
Muslims are said to have constituted more than 50 percent of
the Soviet personnel on the critical Siberian front and to
have made up 70 to 75 percent of the combat personnel of
Tukhachevsky ' s 'Fifth Army", which played a decisive role in
the defeat of White Forces
.
At the conclusion of the Civil War, many of the
nationalities continued to press for the creation of their
own national armies to support their claims for political
autonomy and independence. The Bolshevik leadership rightly
recognized that such a move would jeopardize its control of
the borderlands, and, therefore, national armies were not
permitted. However, the leadership compromised in allowing
the establishment of national military units, with he stipu-
lation that they be restricted in size and firmly subordi-
nated to Central Russian authority. An ambitious, long term
program for the creation of national units was adopted in
1924-1925. Although some success in fulfilling the plan was
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achieved, the program soon foundered, largely because of
the questionable loyalty of native officers and commissars,
language problems, and resurgent nationalism. In March 1938,
all national units were officially abolished.
At the beginning of World War II, the Red Army was
officially composed of ethnically integrated units, but some
de facto national units existed as a result of the recent
integration of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union and
because of the nature of the Red Army's reserve system.
Even though some of these de facto national units proved
unreliable, the government repeated the pattern of creating
national formations when faced with a military crisis. In
November 1941, responding to the German invasion and under
dire necessity to strengthen the failing Red Army, the
State Defense Committee authorized the establishment of
official national units to mobilize more manpower and phys-
ical resources of the republics in defense of the country.
Some national units survived until the mid-1950s, at which
time all were disbanded and their personnel integrated into
regular formations of the Red Army. There were probably many
reasons for this reintegration --including the desire to use
the Army as an instrument to russify the population-- but
disloyalty is perhaps the most important. Emigre inter-
viewees continually cite the refusal of native Georgian
troops to fire on their own population at the time of the
Tbilisi uprising in 1956 as the reason for termination of
national units.
At the present time, all nationalities are assigned
to ethnically integrated units, and personnel are generally
sitationed according to the principle of extraterritori-
ality. That is, most serve in regions other than their
native republic. Russian and Soviet experience in using
minority troops has been mixed. Non-Russian soldiers have
played important roles in numerous specific instances, and
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the sheer number of non-Russian soldiers raised were impor-
tant factors in the Civil War and World War II. In these
cases, as at other times, the creation of national units
facilitated the mobilization of many minority soldiers. But,
in general, non-Russian troops have been --or have been
perceived to be-- of questionable effectiveness and reli-
ability, if not outrightly disloyal. For that reason, past
leaderships have sought to limit the number of minority
soldiers in the military whenever this was possible-- that
is, in peacetime-- and to assign those who do serve to inte-
grated units where their nationalistic tendencies can be
more readily controlled. In event of war, immediate manpower
requirements have superseded these precautions. [Ref. 36]
2. Some Characteristics of the Armed Forces from an
Ethnic Perspective
In all societies, problems created or compounded by
military service and their solutions are likely to be found
in non-military life. The Soviet Union is no exception. The
treatment of non-Slavs in the military is a part of a much
larger policy designed to assure Russian domination at all
levels of Soviet society. The military related problems are
summarized in the Rand Report on the Ethnic Factor in the
Soviet Armed Forces
,
as follows. [Ref. 37]
a. Recruitment
Recruitment policies are designed to provide






non-Russian recruits away from their national territories-
-
is current policy, and no national units exist at this time.
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c. Ethnic Composition of Units
High technology services are mainly Slavic;
construction and support units are mainly non-Slavic; border
Forces are primarily Slavic; MVD Troops are perhaps as much
as 50 percent non-Slavic (primarily Central Asian and other
Muslims); East Ukrainians are dramatically overrepresented
in the permanent NCO corps; and the officer corps is over-
whelmingly Slavic and Russian dominated.
d. Education and Training
Premilitary training is less intensive in many
non-Slavic regions; Most construction unit soldiers, (mainly
non-Slavic), receive little or no individual weapons or unit
instruction; despite some "affirmative action type
programs, only a few non-Slavs opt for military academies
and officer training; and advanced in-service training is
only available, with few exceptions, to non-Russians with a
command of the Russian language.
e. Language
No in-service Russian language training for
non-Russians has been observed; many non-Russians acquire an
ability to function in basic Russian after approximately one
year's service; and authorities cannot control the use of
non-Russian languages outside of formation.
f. Ethnic Relations
Relations between "Europeans and Asians" is
characterized by racial discrimination by the former toward
the latter; individual nationalities tend to bend together
for support; open violent conflict between Slavs and
non-Slavs is not uncommon; conflict between non-Slavs exists
but is less prevalent than that between Slavs and non-Slavs;
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and authorities are reluctant to intervene in ethnic related
conflicts
.
The implications of these factors are important
on combat readiness of Soviet Armed Forces. Therefore,
ethnic related problems and their consequences- in terms of
peacetime management and combat readiness- will be addressed
in last chapters, under the title of performance appraisal.
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III. MECHANISMS FOR DRAWING ON MILITARY MANPOWER POOL
The total size of the Soviet Armed Forces ranges from 4
million to 6 million. The figure of 6 million seems the
least likely of the various estimates. In a recent study of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, the total size was
given as 4.8 million. Also, the figure in the Military
Balance issue of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies of London, was given as 5,050,000 3 as of year of
1984.
There is no doubt that the Soviet Armed Forces have
grown since the low of 3,325,000 in 1961 because of efforts
to meet perceived threats from China, the replacement of
Czech Forces by Soviet Forces in Warsaw Pact Formations, and
the growth of the Navy. However, 6 million would seem to be
inconsistent with any reasonable assumptions about the
balance of numbers between officers, warrant officers, and
extended services enlisted men who comprise the career
service personnel and the numbers of males inducted each
year. Given an average of about 2 years service at the
present time for all draftees, and assuming that 25 percent
of the Armed Forces are cadres, then, in order to achieve
the total of 6 million, conscription would have to absorb an
impossibly high proportion of the annual cohorts of poten-
tial draftees.
The overall population of Soviet Armed Forces still is
not exactly known. The number which is given by Institute of
Strategic studies of London, is most up-to-date however it
does not give the numerical compositions of the services as
3 Excludes some 400000 Border Guard, internal security,
railroad and construction troops, but includes some
1,500,000 command and general support troops.
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of active, civilian and reserve. The following numbers are
taken from the 1984 edition of USSR Facts and Figures
Annual , by John L.Scherer. [Ref. 38]
1. Strategic Rocket Forces: 322,000 active, 51,000
civilian, 616,000 reserve.
2. National Air Defense Troops: 494,000 active, 65,000
civilian, 1,015,000 reserve.
3. Army: 2,840,000 active, 305,000 civilian, 5,091,000
reserve
.
4. Navy: 442,000 active, 111,000 civilian, 663,000
reserve
5. Air Force: 530,000 active, 158,000 civilian, 830,000
reserve




The managing of such an Armed Force through conscription
necessitates an extensive organization of manpower activi-
ties, ranging from the selection and recruitment to the
training, placement and performance appraisal.
The Soviet Union has had a system of universal military
training for males since 1939. Boys are also given premili-
tary training by Soviet schools and other Organizations as a
part of military-patriotic training. Specific premilitary
training requirements and regulations governing universal
military service stem from 1967 Law on Universal Military
Obligation. [Ref. 39]
The most striking change instituted by the 1967 Law was
the reduction in the length of military service. Service in
the army, the coast guard, the air arm of the navy, and the
border and security troops was reduced from three to two
years. Service on naval ships, vessels, coast guard combat
units, and maritime units of border troops was reduced from
four to three years. Inductees with higher education serve
for only one year. It is not unlikely that the efforts of
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young Soviet men to be admitted to schools of higher
learning are partly related to the existence of the defer-
ments and shorter term of military service that a higher
education confers. The 1967 law reduced the age of call-up
from nineteen to eighteen years, thus providing a younger
and less mature set of draftees. In addition, the call-up
for active duty now takes place twice a year, in May and
June and again in November and December, instead of only
once a year. These two periods of call-up coincide with the
completion of spring and autumn intensive agricultural
activity in many parts of the Soviet Union.
The reduction of military service by a full year
compounded by the receipt of less mature draftees and their
induction to the army twice a year created difficulties for
those charged with the training of young Soviet inductees.
This is especially so because most of the inductees are
trained in operational forces and not in special training
units
.
Soviet discussions point out that the reduction in the
length of military service was made possible by the
increased educational level of Soviet inductees and their
resultant ability to acquire military skills that emphasize
technical capabilities and the manipulation of scientific
and technical instruments more swiftly. Indeed, this reason
for the reduction is written into the preamble to the law of
Universal Military Service.
Nonetheless, Soviet military writers make it perfectly
clear that the new law imposes great burdens on them. The
law has established "the bare minimum" period of service.
It is evident that it was not the particular stage of devel-
opment of the Soviet Armed Forces and the instruments at
their disposal that primarily dictated the reduction in
length of service, but rather the demands of the economy,
which also requires young, well-educated, men. Despite the
47
official line in the preamble to the law, military writers
have occasionally conceded that the competition of the
national economy was a factor in dictating the reduction in
military service.
The lowering of the age at which draftees begin their
service is also a help to the economy k This change permits
graduates of Soviet secondary schools to begin their mili-
tary services immediately and to complete it before entering
the labor force. This is more efficient than entering the
labor force, withdrawing for military service, and then
reentering the labor force.
The Law of Universal Military Service leaves an obvious
question unanswered. How is the evident injustice- assuming
that military service is not always welcomed by the
individual-of inducting some draftees for two years of
service and others for three years handled? Soviet journals
are reticent on this question, which also applied, of
course, to all the earlier versions of the law. The problem
is alluded to and dismissed in article 15b: "The USSR
Ministry of Defense is granted the right, if necessary, to
transfer servicemen from one branch (arm of services) of the
USSR Armed Forces to another, with the corresponding change
in the periods of service". Possibly, a sufficient number of
qualified Soviet youths are eager for shipboard service. A
substantial number of them who undergo specialized preinduc-
tion military training study specialties of a naval char-
acter, thus increasing the chances that they will be
inducted into the Navy. Naval service holds the appeal of
faraway places, especially now that the Soviet Navy sails on
all oceans of the world. This appeal is fortified by the
apparently not infrequent tendency of the sons of fathers
This issue was addressed in Kresnaya Zvezda, February
3, 1972, as following. "This law was drafted with due
regard for social changes and proceeded from the needs ofdefense and national economy."
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who have served in the Soviet Navy to request naval service
when drafted. [Ref. 40]
A. MANPOWER PLANNING
Basically, the Soviet Military Manpower system is a
cadre system, with a nucleus of highly qualified profes-
sionals engaged in training inductees and then discharging
them into reserves. Virtually, the entire Soviet male popu-
lation serves in the Armed Forces at one time or another.
Since the end of World War II, the size of the Soviet Armed
Forces has been influenced by the number of young men avail-
able for military service. As previously discussed, the
Soviet birth rate dropped significantly after 1941 and did
not return to its prewar peak until the late 1940s. In 1957,
the number of 19-year -old males, the age for call-up, was
approximately 2,329,000, in 1961 --slightly over nineteen
years after the entry of the Soviet Union in World War II--
this figure dropped below 2,000,000;it reached a low of
914,000 in 1963. [Ref. 41]
In the mid-1950s there were approximately 5 million men
in the Soviet Armed Forces. When the low birthrate of World
War II began to have its impact upon the number of men
available for the Armed Forces, the Party leadership
considered it necessary to explain to the world why reduc-
tions in military manpower were taking place. Krushchev
publicly attributed manpower reduction in the Soviet Armed
Forces to the effectiveness of the new nuclear and thermonu-
clear weapons, making the number of soldiers on the battle-
field of little importance. Soviet leaders especially tried
to make this point with the Chinese, who were arguing that
manpower was the major component of a nation's military
strength. By 1967, the numbers of males reaching the age of
19 each year had almost reached the two million mark. At
49
that time, the period of compulsory military service was
three years, except for certain naval components whose
inductees were obligated to serve four years. It was
apparent that with this length of service and induction rate
of approximately 80 percent of eligible youths, the size of
the Soviet Armed Forces soon would exceed 6 million men,
including officers and non commissioned officers on extended
duty. The solution to the problem was a new Law on Universal
Military Obligation, reducing the obligation by one year for
all inductees (two years service for all except those naval
components where the obligation now became three years.)
Reducing the draft age to eighteen was probably simply
the result of recognizing the facts that by 18 most Soviet
students have completed their basic ten years of education
and that ideally military call-up should take place as soon
as possible after basic schooling is completed. One of
Kruschchev's "harebrained" schemes was to extend school to
eleven years, requiring students to work a few days each
week in factories during the last two years. When this
scheme was dropped and required schooling was reduced to ten
years, there often was a gap of one year between the time
the student finished school and the time he became nineteen
and was subject to military call-up. Moreover, the earlier
the age at which obligatory military service begins, the
sooner the individual can enter the civilian labor
pool; through military service, men often have learned skills
applicable to civilian or defense industry. But there also
was another reason for reducing the length of service. As
Marshal Sokolovskiy observed in military strategy, "it is
well known that the shorter the period of service in the
army, the greater the number of men with military training
discharged every year into the reserves." And maintenance of
a large reserve is the basic element of the Soviet military
mobilization plan.
50
From the viewpoint of a professional officer, reducing
the period of compulsory military service from three to two
years, as specified in the 1967 military service law,
decreased the effectiveness of the military force- in-being
.
For long term reasons, however, the party leadership
considers it more important for all Soviet males to spend
some time in the Armed Forces, where they can receive inten-
sive indoctrination in Party principles than for fewer to
stay longer. The shorter period of service makes it possible
to give military training to virtually the entire male popu-
lation. This provides the Party leadership with a pool of
trained military manpower much larger than that in the
United States or in the nations of Western Europe.
[Ref. 42]
Two organizations peculiar to the Soviet Union play
essential roles in the training and mobilization of the
Soviet Armed Forces. The first of these is the military
commissariat ; the second is DOSAAF-the Volunteer Society for
Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and the Fleet.
1 . Military Commissariats
Military commissariats or Voyenkomats are respon-
sible for the induction process. Each year, in March and
February, young men at the age of seventeen or almost seven-
teen, must register with the local Voyenkomat and bring
along with them certain required documents.
Twice a year, in May-June and November-December, the
local draft boards assemble the draftees of their districts
and select those whom they will take to fill their quotas.
Draftees may indicate their preferred form of service, and
very often they choose one in which their preinduction
training, especially military specialty training, will be
advantageous. The draft board assigns draftees to a partic-
ular service on the basis of these and other considerations.
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At the regional (oblast) assembly point, a final selection
of draftees is made, and some selected by local commissar-
iats may be rejected. Both at the local level and at the
oblast assembly point, the inductees are given a sendoff at
which local dignitaries make speeches, soldiers' songs are
sung, and war veterans talk to the draftees about "heroes,
about banners steeped in glory." [Ref. 43]
Voyenkomats are controlled by the General Staff of
the Ministry of Defense, through the Commanders of the
Military Districts in which they are located. Their offices
number in thousands. Each of the Soviet Republics has a
military commissariat headed, in most instances, by a
general major, who is the military commissar of the
republic. Below the republic level are autonomous republics,
oblasts, national districts, and autonomous oblasts, each of
which has a military commissariat headed by a colonel, and
sometimes a general major. All cities and urban regions have
military commissariats, and cities large enough to be
divided into regions have several. There are about four
thousand military commissariat offices at this level, headed
generally by a colonel, although occasionally higher and
lower ranks will be found. They work in close contact with
the local Party and Soviet Agencies and with their direct
cooperation in all matters. By law they are charged with:
(1) putting into effect measures pertaining to preparing for
and conducting troop mobilization; (2) calculating and
registering human and economic resources in the interests of
the Armed Forces; (3) preparing youth for carrying out mili-
tary service; (4) conducting call-ups for active military
service and training assemblies; (5) carrying out other
defense measures envisaged by the Law on General Military
Obligation; (6) selecting and nominating candidates for
military schools, training assemblies, and courses for
reserve officers and also for the positions of praporshchiki
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(warrant officers in Army) and michmen (warrant officers in
Navy) in troops units; (7) examining and resolving
complaints and applications of call-ups, reservists,
servicemen, disabled veterans, and members of their families
and families of deceased servicemen. In addition, military
commissariats also: (1) designate pensions for officers,
warrant officers, and their families (including families of
generals and admirals); and (2) cooperate in finding jobs
and assuring living space to officers released from the
Armed Forces. Another task of the military commissariat is
to register all guns, motorcycles, automobiles, skis,
cameras, and other resources belonging to individuals that
could be requisitioned for an emergency. Trucks used in
industry, as well as construction and agricultural equip-
ment, have mobilization designations for which the military
commissariats also is responsible. A major function of the
military commissariat offices is supervising the military
training and military specialist training that Soviet male
teenagers receive before they are called up for active mili-
tary duty. [Ref. 44]
2 . Dosaaf
Dosaaf (The All Union Voluntary Society for
Assistance to Army, Navy and Air Force) is one of the most
important organization for preinduction training in the
Soviet Union. The 1967 Law of Universal Military Service
provides for introductory or preinduction military training
"to be conducted for young men of preconscription and
conscription age everywhere, without interrupting production
and studies" (Article 17). This training is to be conducted
at all secondary schools --general, specialized, and
technical-vocational-- and, for those not in school, at
training points set up at enterprises, institutions, organi-
zations, and collective farms. The leaders of schools and
53
enterprises are held responsible for seeing that all boys
receive training for active military service. The law also
authorizes the training of specialists for the armed forces
in educational institutions of DOSAAF and in technical-
vocational schools (Article 19).
Both preinduction military training and the training
of specialists "are conducted under the leadership of the
USSR Ministry of Defense" The necessary training and
material base, the selection and training of military
instructors, and the organization of military training is a
joint responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, other
"appropriate ministries and departments", and the Central
Committee of DOSAAF (Article 19). [Ref. 45]
DOSAAF is defined as a "popular defense-patriotic
organization" whose purpose is "active cooperation for
strengthening the military capability of the country and for
preparing workers for the defense of the socialist father-
land". Under the overall direction of a general of the army
or marshal of aviation, with many active duty officers,
including political officers, assigned to it, DOSAAF has
over 330000 separate units. Its membership encompasses "80
million workers and students over fourteen years of age."
DOSAAF clubs and sport facilities are found in cities and
towns throughout the entire Soviet Union. Regulations
specify that a DOSAAF unit must be organized in each school,
and all school children reaching fourteen years of age,
teachers, and technical staffs" are expected to join.
Textbooks explain how these units will be formed and what
will be expected of members. In 1974, 13 million civilians
used DOSAAF facilities in order to fulfill their norms in
GTO (ready for labor and defense) military- sport complex.




In addition to the functions already described,
DOSAAF is charged under the Law of Universal Military
Obligation with preparing specialists for the Armed Forces
from among the seventeen-year-olds who register to be
called up the following year. The Soviet Armed Forces
require individuals who are trained in one or more of four
hundred 5 specialties. The number of specialists to be
trained is established by the Council of Ministers, and the
list of specialties and programs of training are under the
supervision of Ministry of Defense. An attempt is made to
have those receiving specialist training obtain such
training while at work or in school. Most of the training is
done in DOSAAF clubs or schools and in regular professional
technical schools. [Ref. 46]
The basic element in the DOSAAF organization is the
"primary organization". Primary organizations are found in
schools, in industrial plants, in offices, in farm estab-
lishments, and in enterprises of all types. In July 1971,
DOSAAF claimed "tens of millions of DOSAAF members active in
more than 300,000 primary organizations". The variability of
membership among local areas is high. In one rayon, 90
percent of the adult population were in the ranks of the
society. On the other hand, at a certain motor base only 25
percent of the workers were members of DOSAAF primary organ-
izations. Between 1967 and 1970, DOSAAF constructed 560
buildings for military training and military sports activi-
ties. This represented two and one half times more construc-
tion than DOSAAF had achieved during the four years
preceding the enactment of the Law of Universal Military
Service. [Ref. 47]
5 This number represents the specialties which should be
taught by DOSAAF organization to the prospective draft
personnel in their premduction training.
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DOSAAF operates a considerable number of airfields
and DOSAAF instructors provide flying training. During the
1950s and 1960s a high percentage of famous Soviet Air Force
pilots made their first solo flights while they were members
of DOSAAF, before entering military service. DOSAAF facil-
ities and training courses are provided at little or no
cost. Training is offered to members as "chauffeurs, tractor
drivers, operators, motorcyclists, electricians, radio
specialists of various types, ship navigators, and others".
Such training is designed to improve the quality of workers
entering the national economy as well as to raise the tech-
nical level of youth entering the Armed Forces
.
Any analysis of the .Soviet Union's military poten-
tial, and its capability to mobilize rapidly and train its
manpower for use in the Soviet Armed Forces must consider
both the military commissariat system and DOSAAF.
B. CADRES, CONSCRIPTION AND SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
1. Cadres
Based on universal military service, the Soviet
forces are a conscript armed forces. This however, does not
exclude a strong professional, career component-- officers
constitute approximately 20 percent of Soviet military
personnel while the enlisted cadre personnel constitute 10
percent. The officer component is professional, too, in
that it is increasingly composed of men with higher tech-
nical education. On nuclear submarines and missile ships the
entire officer complement generally has higher education.
In the Officer' s Handbook for Soviet Officers the
following paragraph is the beginning of foreword and it




Command, political, engineering and technical cadre play
a great role in the life and combat activity of the
Soviet Armed Forces. Soviet officers are the backbone,
the cohesive force of our Armed Forces. They are the
agents of Communist Party policy in the forces, they
organize and implement the training and education of
subordinates, they reinforce order and good organization
in units and on snips. [Ref. 48]
The Soviet Officer Corps is comprised of an
increasing number of young officers. More than two thirds of
this cadre has no war experience other than Afghanistan.
A frequently cited figure is that 65 percent of
regimental officers are in the age group under thirty.
Writers point out that it is no longer a rarity for a
company or a battery to be commanded by an officer who is
under the age of twenty-five. Approximately one third of the
Soviet officers have served as privates or NCOs . Many of
them are middle or senior grade officers who served in World
War II in the non-commissioned ranks. Almost all of the
officers in the junior ranks are graduates of military acad-
emies and specialized schools of one sort or another. This
however does not mean that they had not served in the ranks
before being admitted to the military academies.
Particularly fine results are obtained at cadet schools by
those who enter after serving as soldiers rather than
entering directly from school. [Ref. 49]
A second career component of the Soviet Armed Forces
is the NCO personnel who have enlisted for a period of two,
four, or six years. This cadre includes many NCOs with
lower level educational background.
Soviet interest in professionalizing still further
the cadre component of its military forces was underlined in
1972 by changes intended to give extended duty service
personnel quasi- -officer status. Qualified enlisted men
could become warrant officers (michman in navy), and ensigns
(praporshchik in army) with uniforms and privileges
approaching those of junior officers. Extended duty
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servicemen who did not want to serve as ensigns or warrant
officers, or who could not qualify through special courses
or examinations or by attendance at newly developed insti-
tutes, remained as extended duty servicemen until the expi-
ration of their two, four, or six year enlistment period.
[Ref. 50]
Warrant officers and ensigns enlist for a period of
five years. When these ranks were introduced in 1972, Soviet
military authorities provided incentives for enlistment by
offering ensigns and warrant officers automatic reserve
officer status after ten years of service in these grades
without any need to take an examination. Officer status
could be achieved in five years by examination, usually
after study at an appropriate center. It seems evident that
these quasi- -of ficer ranks did not attract a sufficient
number of former extended duty (enlisted) servicemen or
recruits. The regulations bearing on promotion to full
officer status were soon changed to enable ensigns and
warrant officers to become officers after three years of
service by entering higher military schools; and to become
reserve officers automatically, without examination, after
five years of service. The provision of more attractive
conditions has been supplemented by a vigorous recruitment
program. Military units urge the reenlistment as ensigns and
warrant officers of appropriate military personnel who are
being discharged. Military commissariats are told to talk
to discharged personnel who register with them when they
return home and to suggest enlistment for ensign and warrant
officer training. [Ref. 51]
Ensigns and warrant officers volunteer initially for
five years and then may volunteer thereafter for periods of
three or five years. They may remain in service until the
age of forty-five and in the reserves until age fifty. After
five years of service, ensigns and warrant officers who have
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successfully passed examinations are granted the rank the
lieutenant or its equivalent. The same rank can be granted
without examination to those who have served for ten or more
years and have been assigned officer duties. Ensigns and
warrant officers who transfer to the reserves after ten
years of service become automatically "reserve lieutenants".
The Soviet military were explicit in acknowledging that the
new grades were "associated with the greater requirement
placed on command personnel and the need to train competent
soldiers in a shorter period of t ime ... Ensigns and warrant
officers will be found primarily in combat formations".
However, a later statement says that ensigns and warrant
officers are assigned not only to command but also to tech-
nical and Komsomol (Young Communist League) work. [Ref. 52]
2 . Conscription
All male citizens of the Soviet Union, regardless of
race, nationality, religious faith, education, way of life,
or social and proprietary position are obliged to serve in
the Armed Forces. It appears that inductees have little
choice as to which service they are assigned. Rather, they
are selected on the basis of their educational qualifica-
tions, civilian skills, political reliability, physical
characteristics, and the requirements of the service.
[Ref. 53]
Soviet military manpower policy does not content
itself with the combined advantages of a volunteer career
army and compulsory military service. A third level of mili-
tary preparation has become increasingly important in the
Soviet Union- mass military defense preparations. We have
seen that given the present Soviet force size, only about 50
percent of the Soviet eighteen-year-old male cohort is
inducted. The half that is not inducted does not escape
military training. Most youths in the Soviet Union
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participate from an early age in various forms of military
training and military exercises, in mass defense activities
such as civil defense, in various military patriotic assem-
blies, marches, and rallies, and in physical training
programs with direct military applications. A large part of
the adult population is also involved in mass defense work,
especially as members of civil defense detachments. All of
these measures taken together show a steadily increasing
drift in the Soviet Union toward the realization, psycholog-
ically and physically, of "a nation in arms". [Ref. 54]
Registration for call-up occurs at seventeen years
of age, the year before induction. At that time a medical
examination is given, and necessary medical treatment is
completed before the youth actually enters military service.
Eighteen-year-olds are called to active military duty either
in May/ June- those who will turn 18 before 1 July-or in
November/December for the rest. At these times a call up
commission is formed in each military commissariat office;
it consists of a chairman, who is the military commissar,
and the following members: a deputy chairman, who is a
member of the executive committee of the region's soviet of
workers' deputies, representatives of the regional committee
of the Communist Party, the regional chief of the
Komsomols, the chief or deputy chief of the militia, and a
doctor. The call-up commission determines the service and
branch of service to which each individual will be assigned
designating men for each of the five services, the rear
services, Civil Defense, Construction and Billeting Troops,
KGB troops, MVD troops, or for other special troops, such as
chemical, engineering or signal. Quotas are set by the
General Staff. Individuals assigned to military construction
duty are in a somewhat different category from the others.
They must be "fit for physical work," and, if possible, have
completed a course at a building school or have a specialty
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in a construction or building trade. Another task of the
call-up commission is to determine whether an individual
will be excused from service or have his service period
delayed. According to Soviet law a candidate may be excused
for illness or physical unfitness, or service may be post-
poned in order to continue education. Service also may be
postponed if the candidate has two or more children, an
invalid wife, a widowed or divorced mother with two or more
children under eight and no other supporting children, or
one or more dependent brothers or sisters who are under
sixteen or are invalids who cannot be placed in a home. Men
may be deferred for any of these reasons until age twenty-
seven, after which they are no longer subject to induction.
Few Soviet males are completely excused from military
service. According to the late Marshal Grechko , "almost all"
the male population undergoes military training. Deferments
for physical reasons are rare; if the individual can perform
some useful function in civilian life he also can perform
some task in the Armed Forces. The military service should
not be considered as only in active military services. As
previously explained, military training, military exercises,
civil defense activities, military patriotic rallies, and
assemblies are included as other versions of military
service
.
Military Commissariats are a major link between the
Armed Forces and the population as a whole, the funnel
through which candidates must pass when entering active
military service and through which they must return when
they are discharged. [Ref. 55]
C. ATTITUDES TOWARD THE MILITARY AND MILITARY SERVICES
The Soviets have taken steps to increase the receptivity
of inductees to military training and the incentives of
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young people to join the military forces on a permanent
professional basis. They have tried to improve living stan-
dards, especially for junior officers, and have increased
efforts to surround military life with rituals and appeals
that associate the virtues of heroism, national service, and
adventure with military life. They have tried to build a
better image of the military in a very literal sense by
providing better- fitting and more attractive uniforms and
placing great emphasis on a smart appearance.
The 1968 Law for Universal Military Service contains
several articles which spell out the benefits, rights, and
privileges of the Soviet serviceman. Many of these are
designed to increase morale. The law states that the local
Soviet executive committee must "organize send-off ceremo-
nies for those called-up for active duty" (article 32c).
Additionally, this committee is responsible for seeing that
the wife of a called-up serviceman is provided with a job
not more than one month after requesting one and place be
available for her children in nursery or kindergarten
(article 32d) . Active duty and extended duty personnel are
given benefits in accordance with existing legislation for
traveling on rail, water, highways and air routes (article
69). Additional benefits included "privileged rates" for
housing (article 71), tax benefits on cash allowances
(article 74), and free postage on letters addressed to or
from a serviceman (article 75). A final significant benefit
is the right of former serviceman to return to their orig-
inal place of work or schooling. If he had neither prior to
call-up, the former serviceman must be provided with a job
one month after request (article 43). [Ref. 56]
Although the Universal Military Law provides some
benefits to both of draftee and his family, in Soviet Union,
military officials have been making considerable effort to
make military more attractive to young inductees, of whom,
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most are not likely pleased to enter service because of
strict subordination and leaving the relatively easier and
more comfortable style of life of the civilian world.
The Soviets are sensitive to the importance of occupa-
tional prestige. A 1969 Soviet study shows that in terms of
prestige, sales people for retail market, rated only 1.8 on
a 10-point scale. In the same study, professional military
people (presumably Officers) received a scale value of 4.3.
This placed the military forces below scientific and tech-
nical occupations such as physicist, engineer- radio techni-
cian, medical scientist, engineer-geologist, mathematician,
chemist, radio technician, aircraft pilot, engineer in chem-
ical industry, and biologist. These occupations ranged from
a maximum of 6.6 down to 5.3 (for physicians). Below physi-
cians came writers and artists at 5.2, university teachers
at 4.5, professional military at 4.3, and social scientists
in philosophy at 4.2. Primary school teachers ranked 2.5,
and housing maintenance workers were among the lowest
ranking at 1.2. There is apparently considerable variation
in the prestige of the different arms and services . Although
firm evidence is lacking, it appears that the navy benefits
from a certain esprit and reputation resulting from a rela-
tively heavy infusion of the sons of former officers into
this service. When a group of atomic submarines of the
Soviet Navy left their base to circumnavigate the globe, the
Naval Chief, Admiral Gorshkov addressed all personnel with
the words: "You will sail through oceans and seas in which
Russian sailors have not traveled for more than 100 years."
Soviet naval personnel, particularly officers, probably
derive considerable satisfaction from this expansion of the
Soviet Naval presence. [Ref. 57]
Despite the intent to enhance the appeal of the military
as a career choice, other considerations obtrude that erode
the professional status of Soviet military cadres. Of major
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importance in this respect has been increasing Party insis-
tence on its role as the leader in all military matters. All
victories of the Soviet Military, all doctrinal, technical,
and other accomplishments of the military , are due to wise
Party leadership. Further, the Party insists with ever
increasing emphasis that the primary duty and accomplishment
of a military officer reside not in military skills but in
promoting the loyalty of the troops to the Party.
Insistence that the officer is first and foremost a polit-
ical rather than a military leader necessarily diminishes
the status of the officer. In Soviet society the officer now
seems to occupy a modest rank. [Ref . 58]
Soviet military authorities recognize "that a gap exists
between the conditions in which students live at home and
those of military service. This disparity is often the
reason for the difficulties of young soldiers. Therefore, it
is necessary to devote attention (in civilian organizations)
to familiarizing youth with the demands placed upon them by
military service." It is characteristic of Soviet thrifty-
ness to try to escape the cost of reducing the discrepancy
between civilian and military standards of living by
preparing youth for the worst. However the military have
also tried to improve the living conditions of both enlisted
men and officers, especially the junior officers. [Ref. 59]
The conditions of life in the military depend not only
on what the soldier is provided by the military establish-
ment, but also on what he can buy with his military pay. The
pay of the conscript is extremely small and is usually
referred as an allowance. Recruits receive only three to
five rubles per month, with the pay varying according to
the particular job performed. Soldiers who have completed
the required period of service and enter the extended
service receive an increase in pay. [Ref. 60]
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Soviet military authorities acknowledge that officers
are paid "a fitting remuneration" for duties they perform.
They affirm, however, that Soviet youth know well that it is
not the material benefits offered by the military profession
that attract them to officer training schools. One military
writer points out that a questionnaire showed that 85
percent of Soviet young officers were motivated by "profound
ideological convictions" and only 9 percent associated the
officer's profession with high pay. This is contrasted with
American studies, which show, it is said, that the principal
motivation for entering military service is "the opportunity
to earn money." [Ref. 61]
D. WOMEN IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
During the World War I, 5,000 women have served in the
Russian Armed Forces. This number has increased up to
1,000,000 during the Second World War. 500,000 of this
number served at the front and 150,000 women, including 91
of them as heroes of the Soviet Union, were awarded battle
decorations
.
Women between 19 and 30 years old who are unmarried or
who have no children may volunteer for military service.
They may enlist for a two-year term, which can be extended
two or four years. They must have no less than eighth-grade
education. Women, 19 to 40 with specialties, such as engi-
neering or medical training, can be drafted in peacetime.
Volunteers can serve to age 50. All women are subject to the
draft in wartime. Women cannot serve on combat ships or
planes, or guard anything except women's barracks. They are
excluded from service academies , and few become officers . No
active duty is allowed during or after pregnancy. Women
receive pensions of half pay plus 3 percent for each year of
service over 25. The total pension may not exceed 75 percent
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of their service pay. Currently 10,000 women serve in the
Soviet Military. [Ref. 62]
The selection of the women who satisfies the previously
mentioned specifications, is conducted by the Military
Commissariats. The number selected and the military special-
ties for which they are selected are determined by the
Ministry of Defense. [Ref. 63]
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IV. TRAINING AND EDUCATION
"Bringing up a future soldier begins, if you please,
with childhood." This view was expressed in one of the
Soviet military journals in September 1972, in the post-SALT
I period. Another view on the same theme appeared in Red
Star the following year:
A wise saying confirmed in the lives of many generations
says it exactly- people are not born soldiers, they
become soldiers. whether in war or peacetime, military
labor requires a great expenditure of effort from a
person. And this is why the formation of a soldier is
not easy. And it should not begin at the moment when
the new recruit is enlisted into the ranks, but rather
much earlier, at the time of the first signs of
maturity. during the time of adolescent dreams.
[Ref. 64]
On June 27th. of the year 1975, at the graduation cere-
mony of the Military Colleges which was held at the Kremlin,
following quote was addressed by Defense Minister Grechko in
his speech.
Comrades, graduates! This day marks a new beginning in
your military service. Regardless of the specialty in
which you were trained in military college, each one of
you go to take up your appointment in the various forces
as a warrior for an ideal who has offered himself to the
party. Not only are you to be entrusted with powerful
weapons, but you have been given splendid military
education and training which is in itself a highly
valuable asset... The maintenance of the military's
combat readiness at a high level and ideological
activity among the officers and men in order to
strengthen the military are particularly important ... You
have mastered the basics of Soviet Military science in
military college. But only if you apply this knowledge
in the practical dimension and constantly add to it
will you be making a contribution toward military prog-
ress. [Ref. 65]
Having 5 million personnel in Armed Forces equipped with
increasingly modern and high-tech weapons and materiel, the
Soviet Union utilizes a highly developed, carefully
controlled and centralized system of training and education
in every level of Armed Forces' organization extending from
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the training of ordinary soldier to the training of staff
officers. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for the
combat readiness of all forces and is, therefore, in charge
of the entire training system.
In the Officer ' s handbook for Soviet officers written by
General-Major S.N. Kozlov, the theory of training Soviet
Serviceman is specified as following:
The training of servicemen is a specific pedagogical
process. It is organized and conducted in accordance
with the policy of Communist Party and Soviet government
on the basis of present-day military doctrine, orders of
the Ministry of Defense, military regulations, instruc-
tions and programs of combat and political training. Its
main task is to ensure a high state of constant combat
readiness of units, ships, and formations, and their
ability to crush any aggressor who dares to disrupt the
peaceful creative labor of our people. The mastery of
his military trade and the improvement of his knowledge,
skills, and abilities are the official duty of every
serviceman and the basis of all his activities. The
training process extends beyond the training of indi-
vidual servicemen to the coordination and unification of
military collectives. Combat training takes place
primarily in the field, at sea, in the air, at launching
and firing positions, on airfields and tank ranges.
Under simulated combat conditions, the personnel of
subunits, units and ships acquire proficiency in the
conduct of modern mobile battles and learn how to over-
come the difficulties of field and combat conditions.
[Ref. 66]
Following sections will cover the overall training and
political indoctrination process of the Soviet youth. It
also will examine the training and education process of the
enlisted personnel and officer corps.
A. CIVILIAN SCHOOLS AND MILITARY TRAINING
In 1967, at about the time the Law of Universal Military
Obligation was introduced, the militarization of the entire
Soviet population appears to have started. Exact reasons and
purposes for the military emphasis still are
unknown ; however , some speculate that the failure of the ABM
system (Anti Ballistic Missile System), which made it desir-
able for the entire population to learn techniques for
survival in event of a nuclear strike, and fear of China and
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its huge population may have precipitated the new policy.
Whatever the reasons, a major program to make the Soviet
Union a nation trained in arms did begin in this period,
with the military indoctrination of the very young starting
almost in the cradle. By the late 1960s, toy guns,
missiles, tanks and other military toys were prominently
displayed in children's stores. Children's books, with
colored illustrations, showed the glorious, romantic side
of military life. Full advantage was taken of "the time of
adolescent dreams" to indoctrinate the youth with the power
of the Soviet Armed Forces and the honor of becoming a
soldier. [Ref. 67]
Since 1966, the Soviet Union has had a vast and compre-
hensive military patriotic education program. No other
country in the world has such an intensive and all inclusive
program. The average Soviet citizen lives his entire life in
an atmosphere of military semi-alert. Civil defense training
begins in the second grade and continues throughout life.
The 1968 Military Law established pre-military training in
the last two years of secondary education and is supple-
mented by many volunteer clubs devoted to military educa-
tion and training. The entire populace of the Soviet Union
is prepared for war due to the compulsory civil defense
training programs . Training begins in the second grade with
twelve hours of lectures and demonstrations. Eight year
olds learn such skills as the proper wearing of gas masks
and the uses of the bomb shelters. Formal training in the
third and fourth grades is left to summer Pioneer camps
.
Fifth graders spend fifteen hours learning the effects of
weapons and reviewing use of gas masks and bomb shelters.
They also learn the meaning of various warning signals and
rudiments of first aid. Formal civil defense training is
left to summer camps until the ninth grade. Students in the
ninth grade receive thirty-five hours of civil defense
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training. Boys in the tenth grade receive military training
while the girls receive a thirty-five hour first aid
training . Adults are required to attend twenty-one hours
of civil defense instructions to keep them abreast of new
methods. [Ref. 68]
The young men who are not enrolled in schools take their
military training in institutions, organizations, and on
collective farms where large group of people can gather and
be trained. The preconscription training whether given in
the schools or training centers, is a 140 hour program
designed to be equivalent to one year training for a
serviceman. Students acquire minimum military know-how and
skills in a military technical specialty. One program offers
courses in fifteen specialties of which the "most extensive
and most popular" are automobile and motorcycle operators
,
tractor operators, radio telegraph specialists, electrician
and military topographer. Selection of specialty is not the
choice of the student. The council of Ministers determines
the number of personnel to be trained for each specialty.
Each club then trains individuals in each specialty in
accordance with the set quota. This pre-military training is
carried out military specialists who are either teachers on
the staff of the institution or, as is more often the case,
an officer of the reserves. [Ref. 69]
Soviet boys and girls between eight and fifteen are
expected to be members of the Pioneers. These organizations
provide many facilities which include Pioneer Palaces with
huge buildings and various sport facilities. Most of the
parents recognize that their children's membership to this
organization will contribute their future.
The official Pioneer handbook, "Tovarishch"
,
published
by the Young Guard Publishing House, resembles in its
general format the boy scout handbook published in the
United States. However, there are basic differences in
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content. Each edition of Tovarishch contains very attrac-
tively displayed section on the Armed Forces. Colored draw-
ings of Soviet Military equipment, as well as the Border
Guards and Internal Troops. [Ref. 70]
Tovarishch goes to great lengths to explain that "you in
school must prepare yourself for defense of the country, for
service in the Army". One method of such preparation is
participation in national, competitive "military sport
games". The first of these games, Zarnitsa, was started in
1967 and now involves approximately 15 million pioneers and
other school children annually. Zarnitsa proved so
successful for the Pioneers that in 1972 the Central
Committee of the Komsomols organized similar games, Orlenok,
for older teenagers. The Orlenok games, which have been
played annually since, consist of athletic programs and
premilitary exercises, including the use of small caliber
guns and hand grenades. Participation in Orlenok is
intended for students - -both boys and girls-- in senior
classes in regular schools, technical schools, and special
secondary schools, and working teenagers in the sixteen to
eighteen-year-old group. Competitions, marches, tactical
games, and meetings are all designed to prepare the youth
for military service and to contribute to the premilitary
training program. Both boys and girls learn civil defense
measures. [Ref. 71]
Preconscription training is also provided in other
voluntary societes like Little Octobrists, Young Soldier,
Young Sailor, Red Pathfinders, and other small
organizations. In these societes, the boys and girls learn
saluting, map reading, military games', marksmanship, and
other activities related with military and political activi-
ties. DOSAAF has a special place within all these clubs and
organizations. Since it is a kind of manpower planning
mechanism in overall manpower process, it is examined in
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Chapter III, Section 1, under the title of Manpower
Planning.
It is helpful to mention about the DOSAAF's role in
terms of training and education. This union provides civil
defense training, physical exercises, patriotic education,
and communist indoctrination. Specialist training, valuable
to the Armed Forces includes almost the total specialties.
For example, these specialties for Navy include, those of
helmsman, signalman, engine-mechanic, electrician, radio
telegraph operator, or diver. The total membership of DOSAAF
is estimated at forty million, including youths and adults.
[Ref. 72]
B. MILITARY TRAINING AFTER INDUCTION
After the call-up for enlisted men and admission to the
military academies for officers, the military training and
education starts with its every aspects of military profes-
sionalism and party indoctrination. From the moment that
they wear military uniforms, a long and hard period which
has never-ending training and teaching process, becomes most
important part of their life. The training of enlisted
personnel and warrant officers is different than that of
officers, but the essence of the training of this two
different groups are the same which dictates a training
process, ending with the formation of mentally and physi-
cally ready soldiers and loyal party members.
1. Training of Enlisted Personnel and Warrant Officers .
In theory, the young soldier (as he is called until
he takes the oath) has received sufficient pre-military
training to enable him immediately to take an active part in
the regiment to which he is assigned. His first few weeks in
service are spent reviewing military fundamentals such as
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drill and handling basic weapons. Formal entry into the
regiment occurs when he takes his military oath, 6 a very
ceremonial occasion. Certain individuals, selected to
become specialists on the basis of their education and
training, are sent to special schools for courses that last
as long as six months. Candidates for sergeant receive their
six months of training in the school run by the regiment.
Life of the inductees is harsh, and discipline is severe.
Table II shows a typical day in his life. [Ref. 74]
Different types of training are provided to induc-
tees according to their specialties. Strategic Rocket Forces
and Air Forces require that a majority of new recruits to be
sent to the specialist schools immediately. In these
schools, the individual is taught specifically in his
specialty with little training in other specialties. It is
expected that a soldier performs his assignment in the
position where he is assigned, but if his physical ability
limits his doing the job effectively, he can be transferred
to other less-effort requiring positions. However, at the
end, it is guaranteed that the inductee serves this compul-
sory period as effectively as it should be.
s The oath of allegiance is given after the enlisted man
has completed his basic training and assigned to permanent
station, base or ship. The oath is as following: 'I. .
.
, a
citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, byjoining the ranks of Armed Forces, take an oath and solemnly
swear to be an upright, brave, disciplined, vigilant
soldier, to strictly preserve military and government
secrets, and to execute without contradiction, all military
regulations and orders of commanders and superiors. I swear
to learn conscientiously the trade
t
of war, to protect with
all means the military and people's property, and to be
devoted to my people, my Soviet Homeland, and the Soviet
Government to my last breath. I will always be ready to
report, by order of the Soviet Government, as a soldier of
the armed forces for the defense of my homeland, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics. I swear to defend it bravely
and wisely sparing my blood and without regard for my life
to achieve a complete victory over the enemy. Should I break
my solemn oath, may the severe penalties or the Soviet law,
the overall hatred, and the contempt of the working masses
strike me.' [Ref. 73]
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TABLE II
A TYPICAL DAY IN THE LIFE OF AN INDUCTEE
Time Activity
0600-0609 Reveille
0610-0630 Exercise (Tidying up)
0630-0650 Barracks time.
0650-0720 Political Information (Morning inspection)
0725-0755 Breakfast
0800-1400 Training period(Fif ty minute classes)
1400-1440 Dinner
1440-1510 After dinner time
1510-1530 Maintenance : Personnel , weapon, equipment
1530-1830 Political education work
1530-1830 Equipment maintenance (Tuesday and Friday)
1530-1830 Sports (Wednesday and Saturdays)
1830-1940 Self -preparation and homework
1940-2010 Supper
2010-2040 Personal time
2040-2155 Evening walk and checkup
2200 Taps
Source: A.Yurkov, "The Order of the Day" , Mil .Herald
,
Jan. 1976, p. 51.
An inductee is provided with uniform when he enters
the service. He is responsible to keep his uniform in a good
shape. When his service is completed, his civilian clothes
which were detained at the beginning are returned to him.
Also, before his release time, a new uniform is issued to
him. This uniform is also must be kept in good condition and
ever-ready to wear in any future call-up time or mobiliza-
tion exercise.
When a draft completes his compulsory period of
service, he may volunteer to stay in the service for
extended duty for a period of two, four, or six years or
until the age of fifty. Commanders of the units, bases, or
ships encourage the good and quality people to stay at the
service. The slots which require specialized and experienced
people are especially noted and related personnel in these
positions are encouraged to volunteer. The draftees who
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already finished their services can also volunteer if they
are before the age of thirty-five. There also are some
specialist positions that are manned by volunteers who are
contracted for four years. ever-ready to wear in any future
call-up time or mobilization exercise.
The training programs of the enlisted personnel are
highly standardized and centralized in order to achieve
nationwide coordination and cooperation. Due to the multi-
ethnic composition of the armed forces, training and educa-
tion materials and programs are especially emphasized and
instructors are encouraged to take affirmative steps to
insure the high level performance and integrity from the
training. For example, the overall training program
received by a motorized rifle regiment in the Group of
Soviet Forces in Germany is the same as the training program
of motorized rifle regiment in the Belorussian, Kiev, or
Odessa Military Districts. Special conditions, however, are
accounted for in the overall plan. For example, units
expected to operate in desert or mountainous areas or under
Arctic conditions have special requirements, and perhaps
special equipment. All of these special conditions are
included in the overall plan when it is issued by the
Ministry of Defense. Training standards are generated by the
various branches of troops, based on the specific knowledge
tactics and equipment needed by personnel in each branch.
[Ref. 75]
Soviet training doctrine and practice emphasize
combat realism in training situations and consequently field
exercises and maneuvers. This emphasis has been attributed
to limited operational experience since World War II, but
there are other motives as well. Soviet training doctrine is
preoccupied with the stresses of nuclear war and insists on
rigorous training under simulated battle conditions. Soviet
military authorities regret their inability to simulate
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nuclear explosions but they have devised techniques for the
simulation of radiation. Training authorities recognize that
troop performance often breaks down when soldiers have to
execute well- learned activities under live fire and are
convinced that only repeated conditions of severe stress and
high realism will enable soldiers to accustom themselves to
the stresses of real battle. The stress on realism and rigor
in training derives also from the belief that failure to
experience the dangers and difficulties of battle is an
evasion of the spirit of communist devotion. Only under
severe conditions can the soldier demonstrate to his
commander that he has become ideologically hardened.
[Ref. 76]
According to the Officer ' s Handbook edited by
General-Major Kozlov, following arguments are stated:
The forms of training, like the whole military pedago-
gical process, are being constantly improved. Their
development depends upon the training tasks and content,
the authorized organization of the forces, the specific
nature of the combat activities and work of members of
the different services and arms of the services, the
overall level of development of the personnel and the
special characteristics of the fighting equipment . The
practice of combat and political training involves
different forms of training which can be arbitrarily










In revealing the characteristic features and structure
of different forms of training, military pedagogy empha-
sizes that, intelligently combined, these forms permit
both individual and group training, and steadily,
consistently improve the theoretical, practical, and
psychological training of all categories of servicemen.
IRef. 77J
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2. Training and Education of Officers
The officer corps comprise 20 percent of the Soviet
Armed Forces. They are considered the backbone of the Armed
Forces. Due to this importance, their education and training
is very intensive and requires hard work, dedication and
mental and physical qualities which are shaped with loyal
party membership.
As it has been in the whole countries of the world,
the officers are the commanders and many personal specifica-
tions are necessary to become a commander. Being an effec-
tive leader is a synthesis of talent, experience, knowledge,
and most importantly, education and training. The term





by Colonel Skirdo , as following:
The commander of the army of a socialist state is a true
son of the people and a champion of communist ideology
and state policy among the troops. His personal quali-
ties include: a cultivated intellect, flexibility of
thought, the faculty of foresight, military erudition,
organizational ability, readiness to rely upon the
knowledge and experience of subordinates , strength of
will, valor, resoluteness, a willingness to take calcu-
lated risks, and preparedness to rake full responsi-
bility for his actions. A Soviet commander is also
distinguished by special moral qualities: ideological
conviction, political maturity, love of motherland,
ability to identify with the troops, ability to pene-
trate into the soldier's heart and inspire him to heroic
deeds, and finally, justness, integrity and modesty.
These qualities should not be separated from one
another; they constitute a unified whole. If a military
leader is strong willed, courageous and capable of
making decisions, but lacks a cultivated intellect, then
his actions will inevitably lead to errors fraught with
serious consequences. Conversely, if he is capable of
deep theoretical thought, but lacks a strong will,
courage and decisiveness, then he is no more likely to
succeed. This why we say that a military leader who
successfully fulfills the complex function of leading
his troops in an armed struggle is a gifted, talented
commander. [Ref. 78]
Marshal Grechko states the following in his book The
Armed Forces of the Soviet State :
The officers are the basis and skeleton of the Armed
Forces. The combat readiness and effectiveness of units
and warships depend to a decisive degree on the level of
their training and moral-political job qualities.
Therefore the Communist Party devotes the most fixed
attention to the training and education of officer
cadres. [Ref. 79]
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The most significant aspect of the Soviet utiliza-
tion of the officer corps is that they are technical experts
as well as managers. This is because of the inadequate
number and quality of enlisted personnel and high turnover
rate with very low retention rate as well. Therefore the
burden of enlisted training has largely befallen the Soviet
line officer who is a specialist rather than a generalist.
Soviet writers emphasize that a substantial propor-
tion of young officers come from families that have a tradi-
tion of military service. If this means that many of their
fathers served in World War II, the statement is trivial but
the same claim seems to be implied in the case of profes-
sional military service. In the Soviet study of 1000 young
army lieutenants, only about 3 percent are graduates of
Suvarov Military Schools (Military preparatory schools).
But other Soviet studies suggest that about one-third of the
officer cadets come from families with a tradition of mili-
tary service. A study of young naval officers indicates
that among 230 junior and senior naval lieutenants, 202
completed higher naval schools and 13 civilian higher
schools. Of these officers, 89 entered naval school from
civilian schools, 93 from industry, 14 from agriculture, 58
from naval military service, and 17 from the army. 80
percent were married as compared 75 percent of the Army
lieutenants. Prior occupation of one thousand Soviet army
lieutenants are shown in the Table III. [Ref. 80]
The Soviet military journals, especially Krasnaya
Zvezda, periodically announce openings in various officer
cadet training schools. Frequently these announcements indi-
cate that specialties within the school's major field of
study can be chosen by the applicant if he is accepted.
Generally the schools accept military personnel who are
serving their initial enlistment, those on extended service
who are less than 21 years of age, or civilian personnel
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TABLE III






Employed in Komsomol . 0.9
Schoolteachers 0.7
Reactivated reserve officers 10.0
between 17 and 21. Applicants must have completed their
secondary education, be healthy, and pass the entrance exam-
ination at a secondary school level mathematics, physics,
and Russian language and literature.
The requirement for Russian language and literature
may discriminate against soldiers of non-Russian nationali-
ties. This could be interpreted as an attempt to discourage
applications from non-Russian nationalities, but more likely
it is based on the requirement that an officer speak fluent
Russian, since Soviet minority nationalities do not serve
in units formed of their own co-nationals. In Estonia,
shortcomings exist in the teaching of Russian in schools
employing Estonian as their teaching language. This makes
service in the ranks of the Soviet Army more difficult
for young men and constitutes an obstacle to their entry to
military schools. [Ref. 81]
The Soviet military school system for officers is
composed of four basic educational institutions: (1) mili-
tary preparatory schools; (2) officer schools; (3) military
colleges; and (4) training courses. Further, there are (5)
introductory commissioned officer's courses for selecting
beginning commissioned officers from among soldiers and
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non-commissioned officers; (6) courses for those college
graduates on their one year of military service who are
appointed as reserve officers; (7) schools for the training
of officers for such special duties as music and physical
training; and (8) schools set up in conjunction with the
commissioned officers training courses offered at special or
general colleges , etc . The vast majority of those who become
commissioned officers every year are graduates of officers
schools
.
The main characteristics of the Soviet military
educational system are as following:
(1) The existence of a large number and many types
of military schools. At present there are 17 military
preparatory schools (one of which is for the Navy), 138
officers schools, and 22 military colleges. The officers
school in particular, except for one group of schools which
are common to all the services, are divided according to
each military service and the various branches thereof, so
that there are as many as 34 types. Looking at these officer
schools by military services, there are 59 for the Ground
Forces; 23 for the Air Forces; 13 for the National Air
Defense Forces; 11 for the Navy; 7 for the Strategic Rocket
Forces; 9 politically related; 7 for Internal Troops; 5 for
Border Guards. and 4 others for the People's Defense, etc.
[Ref. 82]
(2) Scattered locations over the entire country. The
military colleges are concentrated primarily in Moscow and
Leningrad. However, officers schools are placed in all of
the Soviet Union's military districts, but with about half
of the total number of officer schools (59 out of 138)
concentrated in the three military districts of Moscow,
Kiev, and the Volga Region.
In the Soviet Far East, there are four schools in
the Far East Military District, a general military branch
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command officers upper school, a tank command officers
school, a motor command officers school and the Suvarov
Ground Forces Preparatory School; and there are two schools
in the Baykal Military District, the Air Force's Pilot
Navigation Officers School and a technical school. In the
Pacific Fleet Region, there is a higher Naval Academy.
(3) Officer schools are the backbone of the training
institutions for commissioned officers. In order to become a
commissioned officer, one must complete either officers
school or the introductory officer course, but compared to
the repleteness of the officers schools network, the intro-
ductory officers courses for training commissioned officers
from among the soldiers and noncommissioned officers are
extremely few and on a very small scale. [Ref. 83]
(4) Enlargement of the communications educational
structure. Formerly a communications educational system was
administered on a small scale only in military command
colleges, but since about 1960 such a system has been set up
in technical colleges and officers schools as well.
Communications education department plays a great role on
responding to the need for developments in technical equip-
ment in the military and in the corresponding advances in
technical knowledge.
(5) Small scale commissioned officers training
courses. It is the Commissioned Officers Training courses
which educate commissioned officers from first lieutenant to
colonel separately for each course, and which train regi-
mental and batalion commanders and their staff officers
.
There are only five of these schools, gunnery, artillery,
People's Defense, railway troops, and border troops.
(6) Complex administrative structure of the military
schools. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for the
overall education process for the officers . On the other
hand, in the case of the officers school for each service,
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the command headquarters of that service is responsible for
the educational content and the curriculum, but the actual
administration and operation of these schools appears to be
the responsibility of the military districts. [Ref. 84]
Soviet military and higher military schools to some
extent resemble the three United States service academies at
West Point, Annapolis and Colorado Springs. Entry ages of
these schools are also similar to American equivalents.
Graduates receive a degree roughly equivalent to a bache-
lor's degree as well as lieutenant's commission.
Advanced professional education and training for
Soviet officers are provided primarily by eighteen acad-
emies, which in many ways are similar to service schools,
staff colleges, and war colleges in United States. However,
there are major differences. Courses at war and staff
colleges in the United States last one academic year or
less. Some service school and staff courses in the United
States are measured in weeks . Soviet academies , on the other
hand, offer courses that vary in length from three to five
years, with the exception of the General Staff Academy,
which has a two-year course. Military schools, academies,
and other military educational institutions are located in
over eighty cities throughout the Soviet Union. Students,
faculties, and support personnel of these establishments may
compose a force of more than one-half million men and women.
Of this number, between three hundred and four hundred may
be generals and admirals, serving as commandants and depart-
ment or faculty heads. [Ref. 85]
Military and higher military schools are the basic
sources of the Soviet officer cadres. As mentioned earlier
in this chapter, the Soviet officer is a specialist not a
generalist as it is in the United States Armed Forces. They
are educated as an expert and specialist in the particular
component of the Soviet Armed Forces.
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Each branch of the Soviet Ground Forces --motorized
rifle troops, tank troops, rocket troops, and artillery and
troop air defense-- has its own command and engineering
schools which provide commissioned officers for that
branch. For example, tank troops have six command schools
and two tank engineering schools. Troop air defense has four
command schools and one surface-to-air missile engineering
school. Troops of National Air Defense, not to be confused
with the troop air defense of the Ground Forces, have their
own specialized schools for preparing officers for surface-
to-air missile branches of that service. The annual number
of graduates of commissioned from each school is believed to
be 250 to 500, with 300 to 350 a probable average. Since
there are about 140 schools, some 50,000 lieutenants may be
commissioned each year. [Ref. 86]
Military schools for officers consist of three kinds
of schools. Preparatory Schools, Officer Schools, and
Officer Colleges.
a. Military Preparatory Schools
Among the military preparatory schools, there
are Suvarov Preparatory Schools for Ground Forces and
Nakhimov 7 Preparatory School for the Navy.
These schools offer a civilian senior high
school education as well as the military knowledge for
future military education. There are 16 Suvarov Preparatory
Schools but only one Nakhimov Preparatory School. The
students are generally the sons or relatives of the retired
or active military personnel due to the old tradition of
accepting sons of veterans and those who died in wars. But,
still there is no discrimination between the ordinary ones
7 Suvorov was a famous commander and a strategist in the
latter half of the eighteenth century, and Nakhimov a famous
admiral of the nineteenth century.
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who do not come from veteran or military background families
and the ones mentioned above.
These schools provide the main student flow to
the officer schools. Being graduated from one of these
schools is a source of pride for the commissioned officers.
Table IV gives the names and locations of the
military preparatory schools for Ground Forces. [Ref. 87]
TABLE IV
GROUND FORCES MILITARY PREPARATORY SCHOOLS
Name of School Location
Vorenezh Mil . Prep . School Moscow Mil . District
Caucasus Mil
.
prep . School Caucasus Mil. District
Kazan Mil. Prep. School Volga Mil. District
Kalinin Mil. Prep. School Moscow Mil. District
Kiev Mil. Prep. School Kiev Mil. District
Kuybyshev Mil . Prep . School Volga Mil. District
Leningrad Mil . Prep . School Leningrad Mil. District
Minsk Mil. Prep. School White Russia Mil. Dist
.
Moscow Mil. Prep. School Moscow Mil. District
Novecherkassk Mil . Prep . School North Caucasus Mil. Dist
Saratov Mil . Prep . School Volga Mil. District
Sverdlovsk Mil . Prep . School Ural Mil. District
Stavrapol Mil . Prep . School Volga Mil. District
Tambov Mil .*Prep . School Moscow Mil. District
Tula Mil . Prep . School Moscow Mil . District
.
Ussuriysk Mil . Prep . School Far East Mil. District
(Nakhimov Military Preparatory School for Navy is in
Leningrad)
b. Officer Schools
Officer schools are divided by services and
branches of the services. Their entrance requirements are
almost identical, with the age for civilians who have
completed a middle school education at 17 to 21, and that
for soldiers and non commissioned officers to be under age
of 23. [Ref. 88]
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Entry into the schools is by competitive exami-
nation. Military authorities hope to have at least three
candidates for each vacancy.
TABLE V
OFFICER SCHOOLS, TYPES AND THEIR NUMBERS



















































































Pilots and Navigators 4
Aviation technical off. Sch. 3
Radio jElectr .Commd. Off . Sch. 4
Antiair .Missile Commd . Of f . Sch.
4




















Komsomol organizations, DOSAAF instructors, and
other party and military affiliated organizations are urged
to encourage those in their units whom they consider
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TABLE VI
OFFICER SCHOOLS, TYPES AND THEIR NUMBERS. (CONTD.
)
AIR FORCES
Specialty of School Period in years
Pilot Aviation Off.Sch. 4
Navigators Aviation Sch. 4













Political Off.Sch. 4 9
BORDER TROOPS •
Ground Unit Comm. Of f . Sch.
Naval Unit Comm. Of f . Sch.









Internal troops Pol. Off. Sch.
Internal Troops Comm. Of f . Sch.
Internal Troops Technical-








National Music Sch. Military
Commanders Faculty 5 1
Physical Education and Sport
School 5 1
Firefighters School 3 1
outstanding to prepare for the examination. By regulation,
study time is made available for those on active military
duty who wish to become candidates. Advertisements usually
appear in February or March of each year in Red Star and
certain other Soviet Military publications, listing the
military and higher military schools and advising those
interested how and when to apply. Readily available books in
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military bookstores and military book sections of regular
bookstores give detailed admission requirements and list
areas of recommended study. [Ref. 89]
A candidate can apply for only one school. Exams
are both oral and written form in the areas of mathematics
and science. After the admission to the schools, depending
upon the type of the school, a three to five year period of
study begins. All graduates are commissioned as second lieu-
tenant upon the graduation from officer schools. The period
of study for Naval Academy, five years, is the longest among
the other academies or officer schools.
Table V and VI shows the types and numbers of
the military officer schools related to each of five major
and other secondary forces. [Ref. 90]
c. Military Colleges
There are two kinds of military colleges in the
Soviet Union. They are divided in a general way between
command and technical colleges. The age limits for these
colleges vary between 28 and 45 years of age or first lieu-
tenant and colonel as of ranks. The primary objective of
these colleges is to train regimental and battalion
commanders by means of selective examination.
With the exception of the General Staff Academy,
Soviet Military Academies are specialized, in much the same
manner as the military and higher military schools, and all
theoretically are at the same level. The Strategic Rocket
Forces have their own academy, the Ground Forces have a tank
academy, as well as an artillery academy, and other services
also have their own academies. There are also specialized
academies for the arms and branches that are not specifi-
cally under one service, such as the Military Academy of
Rear Services and Transport. Completing the course at an
academy is of major importance and will greatly influence
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the remainder of the officer's career. An officer who gradu-
ated from a higher military school with a gold medal is
required to pass only one examination with a good mark. An
officer who has won good ratings for his unit may be
selected for an academy if he simply passes the entrance
exams. The purpose appears to be to weigh an officer's
overall potential, not simply his academic ability.
[Ref. 91]
Frunze Military College is one of the most
distinguished colleges in Armed Forces. The students of this
school come from all branches of the Ground Forces, but the
majority is made up of those from the motorized weapon, tank
and artillery branches. They are educated in the staff
duties of the regimental, division, and army levels, and are
trained as commanding officers of the division commander
rank.
The General Staff Headquarters College is the
highest Soviet Military College. Here, high ranking commis-
sioned officers ranging from colonel to lieutenant general,
who are admitted upon the nomination and recommendation of
the Defense Ministry, are given-an education to enable them
to take up duties in the highest military bodies. At
present, nearly all the highest generals in the leadership
of the Soviet Military are graduates of this school.
Officers of the rank of general also come to study there
from the Warsaw Pact Countries. Table VII shows the names
and locations of the Soviet Military Colleges. [Ref. 92]
C. POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION IN SOVIET MILITARY
Any examination of the Soviet soldier's training and
readiness must begin with a look at the ideological training
and communist indoctrination because it permeates every
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system, there are two chains of command. The first is the
traditional chain of command which runs from the most junior
soldier to through the Commanding Officer up to the highest
military levels. The second chain of command is that of the
Main Political Administration. It extends from the Political
Control Officer, to the highest levels in the Soviet
Government. This administration is responsible for political
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control of each member of the Armed Forces. Also, it is
responsible for effective professional military training,
good morale and discipline and, the maximization of Soviet
combat capability.
Soviet military personnel especially the officers are
expected to conform strictly to Marxist /Leninist doctrine.
All Soviet officers are subjected to 60 hours per year of
political instruction, while the enlisted personnel have 160
hours per year. [Ref. 93]
That political indoctrination is an integral part of
military training reflects, of course, the power of the
Party in the military and its interest in using political
indoctrination to reinforce its power and the power of its
leaders. The Army is "a good school for ideolo-
gical ... development "
,
and for the continuation of Party
indoctrination begun in the years before induction into the
service. Marshal Grechko did not hesitate in his writings to
subordinate professional military skills to Party work. "The
first and foremost requirement of officers is to be ideolo-
gically convinced ... an active champion of Party policy."
Colonel General M.Tankayev, astonishingly affirms that "the
Soviet officer is above all a political indoctrinator" . And
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) editorial claims that "constant
political work among servicemen is the paramount task of
commanders". [Ref. 94]
The Party interaction to the military administration is
different in each level of administration. The Chief
Political Administration of the Armed Forces has a subordi-
nate branch in each of the military districts into which
the country is divided; the chief political administration
of a military district works, in turn, through the political
sections of the subordinate corps and divisions. The head of
the chief political administration of a military district is
generally also the deputy commander for political affairs
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(zampolit) of the district and a member of the three man
military council which governs the district. Similarly, the
head of the political section of a corps or division is
generally the zampolit of the corps or division political
section. Thus the zampolit is subordinate not only to the
commander of his military unit but also to the zampolit of
the next higher military unit, who in effect appoints him.
This principle of dual subordination runs from top to bottom
[Ref. 95]
D. PARTY AND THE KOMSOMOL (YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE) IN
MILITARY.
Just as the majority of officers are members of the
Communist Party, so most Soviet enlisted men are members of
Komsomol. This is as much as three-quarters of total
enlisted personnel. During the two or three years of
service, remaining draftees become Komsomol members. The
young officers come mostly from officer cadet schools, and
almost 100 percent of these cadets belong to the Komsosmol
before they even enter the officer cadet school. Once the
young cadet has graduated into military service proper, he
is unlikely to remain a Komsomol member very long, espe-
cially given the pressure to recruit young officers into the
party. Among young officers less than 30 percent are still
members of the Komsomol, and almost two- thirds are already
members of Communist Party. The importance of Party member-
ship in staff positions is reflected by the fact that 40
percent of all army and navy Communist Party members work in
military staff and military administrative bodies.
[Ref. 96]
The Party loses no opportunity to instruct officers and
troops that it, and not the military commanders, is the
leader and controller of the military. A political lesson
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provided for political officers to be taught to the troops
allots eight hours to ensuring that military personnel
understand the full scope of Party dominance. The points
covered in the lesson include: (1) the party is the leader
and indoctrinator of the armed forces; (2) leadership of the
armed forces by the party constitutes the foundation of
military construction; (3) the Party indicates and imple-
ments military policy and develops military doctrine; (4)
the Party determines the general direction of the life and
combat activity of the armed forces; and (5) the Party
develops basic measures with respect to the maintenance of
combat readiness and determines the content of the morale,
political, and psychological training of the troops.
[Ref. 97]
The minimum age for Party membership is eighteen years
and most of the enlisted personnel of Armed Forces are
between the ages of 18 and 28, the age group for Komsomol.
It is possible to be a member both Komsomol and Party. The
mission of the Komsomol in the Armed Forces is to actively
help the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) organi-
zations implement the Party's policy and enhance combat
power. Komsomol organizations are established in battalions,
squadrons and similar units as well as in military educa-
tional establishments and construction units, provided there
are at least three Komsomol members in the unit. These
organizations concentrate on the task of educating class
conscious, ideologically staunch, efficient, and selfless
patriots. They are credited with enhancing the combat
preparedness of the units and attempting to direct the young
servicemen's efforts toward mastering the weapons of their
particular service. [Ref. 98]
The military differs from the civil society in another
way that creates a difficulty for the Party. The Party faces
a problem in the civil society in trying to make a vanguard
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and elite out of a Party in which one out of every three men
30 to 60 years of age is a member. This dilution of the
Party is far more extreme in the military where over 70
percent of officers are Party members and where 90 percent
are members of the Party or Komsomol. Under such condition,
there is a danger that rather than being a vanguard or an
elite, the Party in the Armed Forces may become militarized.
The Party will, therefore, continue to have a more than
special concern for the purity of Party morality and disci-
pline in the military, a concern obviously fortified by the
importance of the military as a locus of great physical and
therefore political power.
There is another point at which Party concern with the
military has a character specific to the military. The Party
claims total and final authority in all matters, large and
small, of military concern. Military doctrine, military
planning, and military strategy are, unlike the problems of
economy, much more likely to be viewed as requiring direct
experience and a continuing exercise of professional skills.
Party claims in recent years to leadership in all military
matters has a certain stridency stemming precisely from the
realization that Party authority in these matters is less
easily established and defended. [Ref. 99]
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V. PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL : CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET SOLDIER
Human performance is difficult to predict and to assess.
Quantifiable factors such as the number of troops or number
of war machines are not the only variables which can be used
as predictors of military capabilities, yet military
analysts or staff colleges usually depend on the data which
available in terms of number of divisions, number of ships,
aircrafts, tanks, etc. Because these data are easy to
collect, analyze and evaluate, generally they are considered
as the basic variables of military power. The trend to quan-
tify military power started with the early military theore-
ticians like Machievelli, Vauban and Jomini . The
introduction of statistics also enhanced this trend and the
final product of mathematics and statistics- operation
research brought this trend to a new height.
Operations research in World War II, clearly enhanced
fighting capacity in a number of areas, but has it aided
planners in assessing enemy or friendly force capabilities?
Although operations research and its descendants have had
their successes, many have expressed skepticism regarding
such rigorously quantified approaches. In operations
research techniques, there are many situations that the
probabilistic techniques are utilized in order to make
inferences about the current subject matter, like a war game
or capability analysis of an armed forces. But, contrary to
the quantified phenomena which dictate that "one with over-
numbered equipment and relatively advantageous geography and
many other positive factors, tends to win", the history of
wars and battles shows a great deal of unexpected military
victories which are totally uncorrelated with the quantified
military power indicators. Surprise, diversion, speed,
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intensive attacks and many other military art techniques
account for these unexpected results. But, these techniques
are also the outcomes of many many other variables.
Quantitative measures of military power avoid these subjec-
tive and intuitive considerations. Especially in the contem-
porary world environment, these subjective considerations
have a distinctive place due to the nature of today's world,
means of civilization, mass media, new areas of science,
mentality formation of post-war and nuclear age youth, phil-
osophic approaches to the legitimacy of war, considerations
about the will of nation to support of a possible war and
many other subjective matters which shape the most distinc-
tive and unpredictable factor, the human factor.
The Soviets generally refer to this factor as spiritual
force. In their military literature, this term is as common
as the term war. The following paragraph was taken from the
Soviet book, The Revolution in Military Affairs
,
written by
Col. General Lomov. Under the title of " Spiritual Forces of
Society and the Increase of Their Role in Modern War ", he
says as following:
A war develops from the actions of armed persons.
Without their intense and self sacrificing struggle,
victory in a modern war against a strong enemy is impos-
sible. Human muscle power has long ceased to play the
decisive role indefeating enemy troops and achieving
victory, and on the other hand the spiritual forces of
the people and the armies of the warring nations have
acquired enormous significance. Victory m a modern war
will be on the side of that state or coalition where the
peoples and personnel of the armed forces will have an
advantage in tenacity and endurance, in the ability to
keep the will for victory under conditions of the most
severe tribulations, as well as in culture and
scientific- technical preparation. In terms of a war,
the spiritual forces of a society are nothing more than
the readiness and ability of the masses to waging war,
without consideration of the difficulties, hardships and
losses, the moral strength, the will for combat and
victory, the ability to resist the pressure of a hostile
ideology and psychology, and a level of education and
culture among the masses necessary for waging war. The
spiritual forces of society, from the standpoint of
their structures, are the reason, ideology, and
psychology of the classes and strata comprising it,
national self -awareness and will viewed on the level of
society's ability to mobilize its forces and reserve,
and to focus them on solving military problems. In the
structure of spiritual forces a decisive place is held
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by the predominant ideology and social psychology which
comprise the morale and political potential in their
relationship to the war. [Re f- 100]
The Soviet soldier is a combination of many psychologic
factors. The following sections will examine these factors
and their effects over the Soviet soldier as the available
information about these most abstract notions can permit.
A. PATRIOTISM OF SOVIET SOLDIER
In the Soviet Officer ' s Handbook
,
the following para-
graph states the patriotic fundamentals for Soviet people.
In our Soviet land, the reinforcement of military might
and the Armed Forces has become a genuinely national
matter, and the defense of the socialist Fatherland the
sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Recognizing
the extreme importance of the unity of the army and the
people in strengthening the defense of the nation, the
CPSU gives this matter its unremitting attention. The
report of the Central Committee CPSU to the 23rd. Party
Congress emphasizes that: "It is essential to improve
civil defense and military-patriotic work among workers,
especially young people, to strengthen the links for
be more concerned about the needs of the soldiers and
officers of the Soviet Army and their families. The
entire Party and Soviet community are obliged to be
constantly occupied with this matter. [Ref. 101]
Soviet analysts of past military successes often attri-
bute them to the two emotions of love and hate. Love the
Motherland and hate the enemy. Thus, the success of parti-
sans and guerillas in World War II was due to the fact that
"they possessed the greatest of all things which a war is
won-passionate love for their country and burning hatred for
the invader". [Ref. 102]
Western writers have tended to note a decline since
World War I in the intensity with which patriotic emotions
motivate soldiers. Soviet propagandists, however, show no
inclination to acknowledge a lesser role for emotion. The
lesser emphasis on love for the motherland is due in
considerable measure to the fact that love of the motherland
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tends to be comprised in many formulations by the precedence
given to love of and loyalty to the Party. It is not
uncommon for Soviet servicemen to be taught "to go through
fire and water," not for the sake of their homeland, but
"for the sake of the great ideals of the Communist Party."
[Ref. 103]
In the multi-ethnic Soviet society the Soviet army is
undoubtedly one of the most important instruments of
national integration. The still predominantly Russian
character of the Soviet Armed Forces reflects the demo-
graphic realities, the military traditions of the Tsarist
army that have continued strongly to influence the Soviet
Army's character, and the qualitative hegemony the Russians
enjoy in the Soviet political life and in the society at
large. In the Soviet theory and practice, the Russians are
considered to be 'the leading nation' , and the one organiza-
tion where this is demonstrated most clearly is the Soviet
Army. [Ref. 104]
The Soviet patriotism of non-Russian personnel in Soviet
armed forces is questionable. Their implicit struggle for
cultural and linguistic autonomy borders on nationalism as
opposed to Soviet patriotism. And this is a major concern
for military administration. Due to this nationalistic
syndrome and past experience from the World War II 8 Soviet
military management is biased to be doubtful about the
Soviet patriotism of non-Russian people, even though there
has never been a clear statement about this shortcoming in
Soviet writings.
8 Under the pressures of World War II, the regime's fears
of minority disloyalty resulted in the eastward deportation
of entire groups of minority peoples . These fears were not
unfounded; several hundred thousand non-Russians defected to
the Germans to fight against the Soviet state during the
World War II.
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The Party sees the army as the school of the nation, and
political education, individual recruitment base,
ethnically-mixed units, and the training program, are all
designed to mould the multi-ethnic manpower into a unitary
product, a soldier imbued with the spirit of 'Soviet patri-
otism', with undivided loyalty to the Soviet Union, to the
Party, and to the ideas of 'proletarian internationalism at
home and abroad'. The value of such indoctrination for the
Soviet Army's combat effectiveness is obvious; as one Soviet
general put it, it serves 'to knit soldiers together into a
monolithic combat group to be reflected in enhanced combat
readiness'. [Ref. 105]
Much of the Soviet patriotic indoctrination attempts to
whip up hatred against rather abstract entities, such as
"the imperialist aggressors." To be sure, the political
officer in his lecture may translate such phrases into more
concrete and hate- inspiring terms, but the popular military
press often contents itself with these vague "imperialist
references". Soviet propagandists are aware that references
to the Nazis and to fascism are still capable of arousing
deep emotion in the Soviet Union and the hate the enemy
theme sometimes seems to revive World War II memories.
[Ref. 106]
B. PSYCHOLOGY. AND MORALE OF THE SOVIET SOLDIER
General Von Clausewitz, the most important military
strategist referred to morale element in his book on the
war, as following:
Moral forces are amongst the most important subjects in
war. They form the spirit which permeates the whole
being of war. These forces fasten themselves soonest and
with the greatest affinity on to the will which puts in
motion and guides the whole mass of power, uniting with
it as it were in one stream, because this is moral force
itself. [Ref. 107]
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Soviet military authorities appreciate the value of
solidarity and morale in the armed forces, but nonetheless
they show a certain unease in dealing with these intangible,
elusive qualities so different from the specificity of regu-
lations and the judgements of guilt and innocence to which
they give rise. Social cohesion and morale cannot be
"ordered" and cannot be "enforced." Even the instilling of
military skills lends itself to a certain degree of forceful
imposition and to a precise testing of the degree to which
learning has been achieved. But solidarity and morale are
desired qualities not amenable to this type of treatment.
[Ref. 108]
In the book War and the Army , the importance of morale-
psychologic factors in Soviet Armed Forces are mentioned as
following
:
The morale of the army plays a decisive role in the war
because, as a material force, it can raise or lower the
fighting efficiency of the troops. Only if morale is
high can all the hardships of the modern armed struggle
be endured and military equipment be used with the
greatest efficiency. Low morale damages the fighting
qualities of the troops. Thanks to the high morale the
professional skills of troops transform into genuine
mastership, which can be attained only if a creative
attitude is displayed, and is impossible where the mili-
tary duties are fulfilled as a formality. A high morale
cements the other element of the combat power of the
troops, multiplies their strength. A high morale
increases the flexibility of the organization and
hardens the will of the troops, strengthens discipline
which steadily grows more essential as technical means
of struggle, the methods and forms of warfare become
more diversified, and the political aims of the struggle
grow more decisive. [Ref. 109]
In the Soviet military thought and military art, the
fourth law of war is defined as following.
The course and outcome of war depend on the correlation
of moral-political and psychological capabilities of the
people and armies of the combatants. [Ref. 110]
This helps to account for the intensive "moral-
political" indoctrination of the Soviet people as a whole
and of their Armed Forces in particular. In case of nuclear
warfare the psychological preparation of the population as a
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whole will have unusually great significance. From the very-
outbreak of the conflict the entire population would face
the threat of instant annihilation. The nation that has
better prepared its population psychologically and provided
training to enable them to hold strong points, keep vital
centers in operation, and restore the economy to its essen-
tial minimums would more likely emerge the victor.
[Ref. Ill]
Morale problems are almost certainly more damaging to
the Soviet Military than the disciplinary problems. The
major influences depressing morale at the troop and junior
officer level are the enormous, unflagging pressure of mili-
tary duties, constant surveillance, and political
indoctrination.
The disregard for physical comforts --despite improve-
ment in the living standards of recruits and junior officers
in recent years-- plays a role in depressing morale, a role
that is partly moderated by the relatively low standard of
living of recruits from countryside. The low military stan-
dard of living would have a less depressing effect on
morale were it not reinforced by the grim pace of military
existence. For the better educated and better off urban
youth, army life, with its strict subordination and endless
political indoctrination, is especially disagreeable,
although some of the urban youths may find compensations in
the greater ease with which they can acquire various
specialist ratings that provide personal satisfaction and
perhaps, more agreeable duty hours. Some personnel have
other compensating rewards, such as opportunities in naval
service to "see the world", or in the air force to be part
of a romantic occupation. The Party and Komsomol activists,
too, may find military life less depressing than do others,
partly because of their authoritarian role, partly because
of career rewards that may come to Party activists, and
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partly because of them are motivated by a sincere Party
fervor. [Ref. 112]
One major group whose morale is subject to considerable
pressure by army life are the recruits from the minority
(non-Russian) nationalities, especially those whose knowl-
edge of the Russian language is rudimentary. It is possible,
of course, that such recruits develop a passive resistance
to the system and intentional non- comprehension. Given the
length and severity of compulsory military service, it is
evident that those who serve are, for the most part, greatly
disadvantaged over those who do not. Whether exemption
produces any special bitterness among those who do serve is
hard to say. Although there are indications that youth do
not want to be inducted, discrimination itself does not seem
to have especially depressing effects on the morale of those
who are. It is likely that where such effects do exist, they
are associated with other social discriminations such as
those related to nationality or class. [Ref. 113]
C. INITIATIVE AND PHYSICAL STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET SOLDIER
Initiative of combat personnel provides independent
action which is very important for success in combat.
Acting independently when it is necessary is one of the
principal traits of a commander. An armed force having
commanders with high initiative can overcome many lateral
problems of Command, Control and Communication.
One of the primary objectives of the Soviet training
programs is to provide the development of initiative and
creativity for its officer corps. Initiative in Soviet
military forces is encouraged and the insufficient freedom
of action of Soviet officers is seriously criticized by
military experts and generals. The book To Creatively Solve
Military Problems ( Boevye Zadachi Reshat Tvorcheski ) , by
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Col. General Tretiak, discusses the need for Commanders to be
flexible in battle, to utilize varying methods to take
advantage of changing conditions, to avoid ossification,
formalism and patterns, and to display initiative 9 and
self-reliance. Soviet military instructors especially
emphasize the value of independent creative action by offi-
cers on the battlefield and resourcefulness of every
officer. They generally give practical examples to the
students about this issue.
Recent Soviet concern with the ill effects of restric-
tions on officer independence and their consequent fear of
responsibility is certainly related to long standing prob-
lems of military leadership, but a a new note of urgency
stemming from the existence of nuclear weapons can be
detected in Soviet discussions of how much freedom should be
allowed officers. In the June 3, 1972, issue of the Krasnaya
Zvezda
,
the following passage appeared:
In connection with the revolution in military science
there is an even greater increase in the significance of
initiative and independence. Under present day condi-
tions a commander cannot count on receiving exhaustive
instructions from a senior commander at all stages of
the battle. In complicated and tense situations, under
conditions created by unexpected and sharp changes in
the situation, the commander will have to make respon-
sible decision on the basis of the overall concept of
action. [Ref. 115]
9 An evaluation of affairs in the Belorussian Military
District illustrates his point and spells out some defi-
ciencies. Some officer do not bother with independent search
for information about the enemy. They simply wait for infor-
mation from superiors. Contrarily, some superior officers
provide such liberal amounts of information to subordinates
that the subordinates rely totally on it. Both conditions
stifle initiative. One attacking subunit of a tank regiment
successfully performed its day s mission and prepared to
continue the attack the next day. That night the senior
commander worked out the mission and plans of the subunit.
When on the following day conditions changed, the subordi-
nate subunit commander was unable to cope. The unit was
attached piecemeal and unsuccessfully. The subunit commander
evidenced lack of flexibility caused by practices of the
senior commander. [Ref. 114]
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In World War II Soviet military power suffered from the
lack of initiative in their lower level troops. In high
command level however they exhibited initiative and a flex-
ible decision making process. About these high command offi-
cers, the German observers wrote the following during the
war
:
The higher echelons of Russian command posts proved
capable from the very begining of the war and learned a
freat deal more during its course. They were flexible,
ull of initiative, and energetic .. The extraordinary
industry with which these commanders went about their
duties was characteristic. [Ref. 116]
Contrarily the Germans observed relatively lower flexi-
bility and fear of responsibility in the Soviet lower level
troops such as division and below levels. The observation of
Erhard Raus , a four star general during the war, is as
follows
:
The Russian infantryman was a member of the mass,
preferring to fight in concert with others rather than
bo be left to his own devices. In the attack this was
evidenced in the massed lines, sometimes almost packs;
in the defense it was shown by the stubbornly resisting
bunker complements. Here there was no individual action.
[Ref. 117]
The Soviets, emphasizing historical lessons to prevent
the repetition of past errors, ever- increasingly insist on
development of their personnel's initiative and capacity to
take responsibility. Nevertheless, every commander in the
armed forces "is responsible for the actions of his subordi-
nates as well as his own". The commander, therefore, has a
strong incentive to restrict the initiative and indepen-
dence of his subordinates if he can thereby decrease the
chances of the latter making major errors for which he will
be held responsible. The commander may very well hesitate to
follow this advice to trust the young officer and to support
reasonable initiative. [Ref. 118]
Soviet people live in a land with one of the harshest
climates of the world. Because of the climate, Soviet
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people became accustomed to survive under harsh natural
conditions throughout the centuries. Since they are ever
encountered with the difficult living conditions of the
motherland, training the Soviet military personnel for
real-like combat scenarios should not be hard, at least, in
terms of winter time war conditions . Their fleets also
encounter with the harsh sea environment. Most of their
passage-to-ocean ways are mostly in cold regions like the
North Sea and Baltic. In general, we can say that an ordi-
nary Soviet soldier is more familiar with the cold weather
than with the hot weather.
General physical characteristics of Soviet soldier can
be summarized as following:
1. They are strong and determined enough to cross rugged
and seemingly impassible terrain of USSR.
2. They are self sustainable in sub-zero temperatures
for long periods
.
3. Due to the climate, nature and their nutrition,
generally they live longer, they are more immune to
illnesses, and they recover from injuries in rela-
tively shorter times.
4. They can exploit the nature wisely for war-fighting
purposes such as camouflage and cover.
The following quote is from an analysis of German opera-
tions in Soviet front during the World War II.
The frugality of the Russian soldier was beyond German
comprehension. The average rifleman was able to hold
out for days without hot food, prepared rations, bread
or tobacco. At such times, he subsisted on wild berries
or the bark of trees. His personal equipment consisted
of a small field bag, an overcoat, and occasionally one
blanket which had to suffice even in severe winter
weather. Since he traveled so light, he was extremely
mobile and did not depend on the arrival of rations and
personal equipment during the course of operations.
tRef. 119] H V B
Soviet battlefield philosophy, with its stress on rapid
continuous attack, demands great endurance from the Soviet
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soldier. Consequently, the physical conditioning of the
soldier is an integral element of the overall combat effi-
ciency of the Soviet military.
Physical training period for an average unit like bata-
lion covers 12 hours a month which includes 6 hours of
gymnastics and 6 hours of obstacle crossing and jogging.
The shortcomings related to physical training of military
personnel as stated in Soviet self-criticism writings are as
follows
:
1. Lack of knowledge of some officers on physical
training
.
2. Insufficient quantities of special training manuals
for teaching some sports and for training qualified
coaches
.
It is believed that the program is considered by the
Soviets to be successful. No major revisions are anticipated
in the near future. [Ref. 120]
D. LEADERSHIP AND MOTIVATION TO FIGHT
Leadership in war constitutes one of the most complex
and responsible areas of human activity. During the World
War II, Soviet armed forces provided pure examples of lead-
ership and motivation to fight. After the Battle of
Stalingrad, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the USA,
commenting on the significance of the Soviet victory,
stated: "Such achievements are possible only to an army that
has skilled leadership.." [Ref. 121]
Motivation to fight is the final outcome of the effec-
tive leadership. Since the leadership is a function of many
personal traits and circumstances, the prediction about the
leadership is impossible. Only way to improve leadership
skills is continuous training with the strong indoctrination
which supplies the intangible element of combat
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effectiveness. The legality of conflict, the reason of
armed forces, the traditional philosophy of the nation on
the current problems and conflicts are the examples which
might shape the philosophical background of a soldier which
then causes the formation of intangible element. Leadership
uses this intangible element to retrieve motivation.
Hate the enemy, love the motherland; these complementary
injunctions of Soviet indoctrination were taught by Lenin
himself, and it appears that one can scarcely have an
adequate love for the motherland without having an equally
intense hatred for her enemies . Although love for the
motherland is a "powerful source" from which Soviet fighting
men draw their readiness to endure and take risks, hatred
for the enemy "is the most important component part of the
perseverance and heroism of the Soviet troops". [Ref. 122]
According to the German military writings analyzing
Soviet motivation to fight during World War II, the
following results have been obtained: [Ref. 123]
1. Love for mother Russia which was presented as perhaps
the most basic underlying motivation.
2. Hate for the Germans, which was fanned by both German
atrocities and Soviet propaganda.
3
.
Fear of being captured by the Germans , which was
based not only in the fear of what the Germans would
do to a prisoner of war, but also that he would be
regarded as a traitor by Soviet officials if he was
ever able to return to the USSR.
4. Fear of the punishment for failure to obey his orders
or for retreating.
The preceding factors have become the primary reasons
for Soviet soldier to fight swiftly and vigorously during
World War II. Among these factors, German analysts attribute
two of them as the most effective ones. The first is the
love of motherland and second one is the fear of the
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consequences of his failure. In the following quote written
by German observers, the love of homeland theme is exempli-
fied:
He is not an active communist, not a political zealot.
But he is a conscious Russian. . .who fights only in rare
cases for political ideals, but always for his
fatherland. IRef. 124]
Also :
The motive of fear may have been the final resort in
difficult situations, but basically the Russian had no
less national-as distinguished from political-patriotism
than the soldiers of western armies, and with it comes
the same source of strength. Unceasing propaganda has
burned nationalism into his soul. And however impervious
he may be to foreign propaganda. he nevertheless has
been unable to escape the engulfing waves of his own.
[Ref. 125]
As previously mentioned, the predictions about the
future capability to motivate Soviet soldier and to have
effective leadership for combat activity are beyond the
deterministic and stochastic reasonings. The only prediction
which can be done on this issue is the anticipated continua-
tion of political indoctrination of military and civilian
populations and its consecutive results related to the
preparedness to the conventional and nuclear wars. Ever
existing images of potential enemies created by doctrinal
conflicts or national security concerns, will help sustain a
national patriotic will to conduct and to support a possible
war fought by the Soviet Union.
E. TECHNICAL PROFICIENCY AND ABILITY TO LEARN
In today's Soviet military, modern weapons and equip-
ments necessitate having capable personnel who are able to
use, maintain and repair such systems. The term "capable
personnel" refer to those who have adequate training which
is enough to handle modern weapons or equipments effectively
under combat or non-combat situations. Besides training,
this requires reaction capability, physical strength, and
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most of all an intelligent and healthy brain, that is,
mental ability.
The overall objective of the selection process either in
military or civilian world is to match the man to the job.
Various techniques are designed and implemented in order to
predict the future performance of the selectee. With modern
statistics, tremendous amount of different techniques are
used to make inferences about the human performance issues.
Any thinkable variable which might affect a person's
performance is taken into account and different manipula-
tions of person-related data are done simply for having a
predictor-performance correlation. The most important
predictors surely are mental state and mental ability.
By mental state is meant that the time- limited func-
tional state of the human mind which predetermines its work
capacity, readiness to overcome work loads, and its poten-
tial for rapid and accurate reaction and maximal degree of
mobilization at the required moment. A mental state
expresses the temporal characteristic of a person's mind and
is manifested in an elevation of the spirits or depressions,
a working condition, or sluggishness, etc. Mental ability in
psychology is understood as a specific, stable quality of
the human mind which engenders the possibility of successful
activity of a specific nature. The essence of this quality
is not so much in the current level of development of a
given mental process, as in the possibility of its rapid
development. [Ref. 126]
As new weaponry is introduced in Soviet armed forces,
increasing importance is given to the selection and training
of personnel. General Lieutenant Zav'yalov stated the
following in his article "The New Weapon and Military Art":
New weaponry makes abnormally high demands on the moral
political and psychological training of troops. Given
all the extraordinarily expanding opportunities posed by
weaponry and given the best military art, the outcome or
a battle, operation or war is, is as a whole decided by
people, who possess a high degree of military skill and
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who are strong in spirit.... No less important is the
task of timely and qualitative mastery or new forms and
methods of military operations by the troops themselves
along with improvement in the approach to their work by
commanders and staffs. Only thus, by joint efforts, is
the genuine art of achieving victories created.
[Ref. 127]
Differentiation in conscript composition is mainly due
to ethnic origin and to educational level. Since the educa-
tional level of the inductee is an outcome of the mental
state, the assignments are based on mental state require-
ments of each service .( Similar to AFQT Scores of USA armed
forces). In elite terms, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and
National Air Defense Troops rank as first in terms of
educational and mental requirements. Both require full pre-
conscription training, good political training and non-
ethnic element. Airborne unit personnel are chosen
voluntarily from those with the DOSAAF training. Artillery
and engineer units in ground forces require large number of
technically qualified and well-trained personnel rather than
those are brave but at lower mental categories.
Consequently, one could expect a balance of town and country
conscripts in these arms. Tank and motor rifle troops also
require technically competent personnel. Navy and Air
Forces, having second sophisticated weapon systems after the
Strategic Rocket Forces, necessarily require technical as
well as physical traits, due to the nature of the job. As
previously explained in chapter I, the navy personnel hold
the specialties more than other services'.
The emphasis placed on the quality of naval personnel
can be seen at the following passage written by Admiral
Sergei Gorshkov:
The potential contained in our equipment can be realized
fully only with a high degree of special preparedness by
the entire ship's company. It is impossible to be
satisfied now by a mediocre level of training. . .Each
navyman must have a detailed firm, knowledge ... at the
outstanding or good level. . .This means an absolute and
even pedantic observance of all demands of instructors
and manuals. [Ref. 128]
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In regard of conscript training, two or three years of
service period could be seen an ample time, but this is not
reasonably enough to teach high-tech weapon systems and
their essential maintenance. A Soviet commander must main-
tain his unit at the peak of combat readiness, trained and
prepared to go at a moment's notice ;yet at the same time he
must run it as a training unit, with a constant and rapid
turnover of conscripts, when all the time the volume and
complexity of equipment is increasing, and an increasing
amount of time must be devoted to physical training and
political education. Under these conditions one should have
fast learning ability as well as practicality to implement
those who learned in training field.
Soviet self-criticism has various writings mention about
a lack of specialist knowledge of equipment and complaint of
insufficient time and training material to teach personnel.
The following self-criticism is taken from the April 5,
1969, issue of Krasnaya Zvezda , Captain 2nd Rank-engineer
Andrusenco says
:
Experience shows that breakage and malfunction are not
necessarily the consequences of clear-cut, gross viola-
tions of the rules for operating technology and
ordnance. Even minor departures from the requirements of
operating manuals or carelessness, in the discharge of
duty responsibilities can become the cause of malfunc-
tions ... Stat istics show that malfunctions are less often
due to material defects than to lack of preparedness on
the part of some specialist.
One another example of the self criticism on technical
proficiency issue appears on the theory-practice relation-
ship of the technical knowledge. The following is taken
from the Journal of Rear Services and Supply ( Tyl i
Snabzenhia )
:
Graduates of military educational institutions possess
the theoretical knowledge, but lack the practical
experience and skills needed to effectively carry out
their duties ... Such training programs frequently are not
based on an analysis of the needs or capabilities of
young rear service officers. More effort is needed to
identify the weaker officers so that individualized
training can be given to them. [Ref. 129]
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F. MILITARY ATMOSPHERE AND DISCIPLINE
Discipline is the "absolute observance of Soviet laws,
military regulations, and the orders of command personnel".
Discipline then, is obedience to externally imposed impera-
tives. No other sector of society requires such detailed
legal regulation as the armed forces. For most military
establishments, discipline in everyday matters is a training
for the automatic obedience especially required in periods
of great stress and danger. Individuality in behavior
threatens the ability of members of a military team to
respond without question to commands and to apply unhesitat-
ingly learned routines. Individuality also complicates the
administration of large numbers of men even in peacetime.
[Ref. 130]
Soviet military art considers the discipline as an
inevitable and most necessary factor which affects readi-
ness. According to the materials which appeared in open
press. The following quote explains the Soviet version of
discipline- combat readiness relationship:
Standards of discipline are increasing as the importance
of the time factor increases. Complete readiness to
repel a surprise attack and successful action to destroy
the enemy are only possible when there exists a high
level of discipline and organization. [Ref. 131]
The keystone which shapes the discipline in Soviet mili-
tary finds its essence in the following quote:
Military discipline is based on the awareness by each
serviceman of his military duty and personal responsi-
bility for the defense of his Motherland- the Unxon of
Soviet Socialist Republics. [Ref. 132]
The superior- subordinate relations constitute one of the
important foundations of discipline. Soviet doctrine
dictates that in a superior- subordinate relationship, the
superior is totally responsible for the actions of the
subordinate [Ref. 133]. Because of this factor, the rela-
tionships are remote and tense. Any misconduct on this rela-
tionship might severe the superior's observed performance.
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Soviet disciplinary problems are aggravated by the exis-
tence of two rival sources of authority, that of the
commander and that of the political officer. It is the party
that is most demanding with respect to discipline. Both
recruits and officers who are not Party zealots ("we") have
a common opponent, the Party ("they"), and have a collusive
interest in protecting themselves against the severity of
Party surveillance and treatment. [Ref. 134]
A third source of disciplinary difficulty is common to
organizations and societies in which the deprivation of
liberty or other punishments have relatively little effect
on the general level of life of the persons punished. For
recruits, military life is a severe and punishing round of
duties, and neither the guardhouse nor the disciplinary work
battalion may have quite the deterrent value that they have
in a military establishment that provides for more
indulgences
.
The military uniform reflects the desire for uniformity
and the restraint of individuality. Detailed regulations
covering all phases of military existence also produce a
degree of uniformity hardly equaled in civilian life. Today
there is a tendency in western military forces, in response
disinclination of the young to subordinate themselves to
military regimes and to military discipline, to permit
greater latitude in behavior. It is not so confidently
assumed that individuality necessarily produces a deteriora-
tion of combat capabilities. In any case, military leaders
of western armies have found it expedient to permit the
recruits forms of behavior and modes of dress that the
modern military had not hitherto tolerated. In the Soviet
military establishment , there is great reluctance to make
concessions similar to those made by some western armies.
[Ref. 135]
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The reduction of the age of conscripts from 19 to 18 and
the increasing level of education have apparently led to a
reduction in the number of criminal offenses committed by
soldiers. There is no indication that they have reduced
recruit dispositions to ignore lesser regulations. If we
leave aside drunkenness, hooliganism, and the exploitation
of younger by older soldiers, the two categories of offenses
that probably have the most serious consequences are (a)
offenses against state (military) property and (b) falsifi-
cation of training, disciplinary, and indoctrination records
and the collusion required to effect this falsification.
Property offenses are common to many military establish-
ments, but falsification has origins and consequences
special to the Soviet military because of the important role
that socialist competition and the grading system play in
the Soviet forces. [Ref. 136]
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VI. PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL : READINESS
How would Soviet soldiers perform in a major war? Can
the extreme specialization of Soviet military schools and
intensive pre- induction training produce officers and
enlisted personnel capable of operating satisfactorily on
today's complex battlefield? Can 5 million men armed forces
be effectively controlled by a relatively small group of
highly qualified senior officers in the General Staff, if
the remainder of the officer corps are primarily special-
ists? How soon a general mobilization would be achieved
depending on a relatively obsolete railroad transportation?
Is there any way that we can measure and evaluate the
readiness of Soviet troops?
The answers to all these questions are going to be vague
and very abstract without clearing up the main issues. As
discussed in previous chapters, readiness is a synthesis of
numerous variables. These variables rank according to their
role in a given situation. For a well-trained and highly
skilled armed forces quantity of weapons could be less
significant than the quality of weapons. Similarly, calling
up tens of thousands men to the services and giving no
professional training would mean only a mass of human, not
fighting men. Or, very intensive training without combat
realization would create strong and swift uniformed
personnel, but real fighting men. These considerations can
go on indefinetely This is why the military art is called as
an art. Creativity, surprise, unexpected chance, and many
other variables play significant role in readiness issue.
Up to this chapter, the general formation of Soviet
soldier with his or her indoctrination, education and
training, has been examined. Still, many questions about the
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quality of Soviet soldier are unanswered due to the wide
area of human related activities and their results in Soviet
people, like morale, initiative, ability to fight etc. Many
written material about the Soviet soldier is based on the
data which are obtained from dissidents or ex-Soviet allies,
and Soviet publications. It is difficult to conclude
whether or not they are doing well from these available
data. The best way of evaluating the militaries surely is to
observe them in combat situation with the analysis of their
nation's support and will to continue this war. There are
solid facts about the manpower issues of the Soviet military
such as population trends, economic aspects of manpower
issues, the young age composition of officer corps, semi-
annual conscript turnovers with related management problems
and so on. According to the history and the lessons which
can be taken from the history, the Soviet people are
vigorous and strong and never hesitate to defend their moth-
erland. World War II is full of examples which identify
these specifications of Soviet people. But, today's world
circumstances are totally different compared to those of
1939-1945. At least, the generations who were born after the
1945 did not see any world war, but local conflicts and
local wars. The reasons and forms of the wars and their
public implications changed dramatically. The welfare and
general life standards also changed and, most of all in last
ten years, computers have caused major differences in every
aspects of human activity. State-of-the-art weapon systems,
conventional cruise missiles, high speed warplanes , nuclear
powered warships with the capability of pinpoint targeting
from over- the-horizon distances. These are limited number of
examples without considering the thermo-nuclear weaponry.
Readiness cannot be measured. This could be the easiest
answer to all previous questions. But readiness can be
evaluated. Some constraints and easy to quantify variables
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can be set. Related to the manpower issues, the mobilization
potential, quality of reserve training, emphasis on civil
defense can be some criteria for evaluating the readiness of
manpower. The following sections will examine these issues
and their impacts on the readiness of Soviet soldier.
A. RESERVE DUTY AND MOBILIZATION
When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the
Soviet leadership reportedly was able to mobilize 5.5
million men in eight days. When able-bodied men born between
1905 and 1918 (except those in central Asia and Far East)
were ordered to active duty, that number swelled. With the
current emphasis on reservists and mobilization procedures,
the Kremlin should be able to react much more swiftly today.
According to the Soviet law, inductees are placed in reserve
status after active duty service and are assigned to catego-
ries depending on age. They remain subject to call-up for
refresher training until they reach the age of fifty. The
reserve categories and service requirements are shown in the
Table VIII. [Ref. 137]
The Soviet military retains considerable control over
the reservists who after completing the service, can not
feel himself totally separated from the military atmosphere.
For instance, the air reservists are subject to a maximum 19
months of additional training in their reserve life. Also,
reservists can be summoned to attend "examination sessions"
for a period lasting up to ten days. The training time can
be imposed on reserve officers is even greater. Reserve
officers under thirty-five years of age can be summoned
every year for a period lasting up to three months each
time, although the total amount of time spent in reserve
sessions is not to exceed thirty months, that is, two and
one-half years. However, "the USSR Minister of Defense has
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TABLE VIII
RESERVE SERVICES FOR SOLDIERS AND SAILORS
Category Service over Service less than
one year one year
First Cat. Reserve call-ups Reserve call-ups
(to Age 35) 4 times, 3 months 3 months each






Second Cat. Reserve call-up
(35 to 45) 1 to 2 times,
2 months each.
Third Cat. Reserve call-up
(45 to 50) 1 time,l month.
the right to detain, if necessary, reserve officers,
generals, and admirals at refresher training sessions for up
to two months longer than the periods established by this
law, and also to increase the number of refresher training
sessions for reserve officers, without exceeding the total
amount of time spent at sessions." [Ref. 138]
Reserve officers can be assigned during peacetime to
full active duty for two to three years if they are under
thirty years of age. Recalling reserve officers for two to
three years of active duty is occurs often. Soviet discus-
sions of training, discipline, and other problems of the
officer corps make not infrequent references to the cases
involving young reserve officers who resent their recall
from civilian life. A reserve lieutenant called to duty
wrote to Kresnaya Zvezda: "When battalion commander asked me
to take over the company, I was quite surprised and natu-
rally refused. I explained my refusal by pointing out that I
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am not a cadre officer. There is much that I don't know. I
cannot be responsible for combat equipment and materiel. And
now I have been punished for no reason whatsoever."
Krasnaya Zvezda comments: "In fact, it appears that the
lieutenant was punished for questioning an order. The lieu-
tenant is complaining that he, an officer called up from the
reserve, is being compelled to serve on a par with cadre
officers." [Ref. 139]
The main complaints of the young reserve officers is the
interruption of their professional career in civil society.
These officers constitute a major part of the technical
officers corps and most of them are specialized and are
needed in the armed forces. Although they are encouraged to
stay in military as a cadre officer, their attitudes are
negative to the military life and this is unfortunate for
the military planners.
How rapidly and efficiently could the Soviet Union mobi-
lize its manpower? A definitive answer to this question is
impossible. Even if all facts about Soviet mobilization
planning were known, which they are not, there still would
be differences of interpretation. However, it is known that
planning for mobilization is a direct responsibility of the
General Staff and it receives major emphasis. The General
Staff delegates its authority for mobilization to the mili-
tary districts where military commissariats are primarily
responsible for putting into effect measures pertaining to
preparing for and conducting troop mobilization.
Soviet combat forces , other than Strategic Rocket Forces
and Troops of National Air Defense, are deployed primarily
in sixteen military districts. All troops of the Soviet
Ground Forces, except those stationed abroad, are assigned
to the commanders of the military districts. In addition all
units of frontal aviation are under the control of the mili-
tary district commanders as well. Thus military district
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commanders have under their direct control both ground and
air units capable of waging independent combat actions. The
military district could operate as a military theater. If
needed elsewhere, forces assigned to a military district
move out to form a new front, or several fronts, leaving
behind cadres to reestablish the military district forces
through mobilization of additional men.
Soviet mobilization plans call for two different appli-
cations. One is unit replacements and the other is indi-
vidual replacements. The following paragraph explains both
applications
.
Soviet strategists consider that entire divisions might
be completely destroyed in the event of a nuclear war. If
nuclear weapons are employed, contingency mobilization plans
therefore call for divisions or regiments to be replaced as
units, rather than for replacement of individual casualties.
If there is a conventional phase in a future war, the number
of troops would be increased immediately upon the outbreak
of hostilities, with further mobilization providing addi-
tional manpower as losses were suffered. In this case indi-
vidual replacements might be used. [Ref. 140]
In the book Soviet Military Strategy , Marshal
Sokolovskiy defines the mobilization and related issues as
follows
:
As is known, by mobilization or mobilization deployment
of the armed forces, we mean their conversion from a
peacetime footing to a war footing in accordance with
the war plan. In practice, mobilization either takes the
form of supplementing existing military organizations
with war-trained men and combat equipment until a war
footing is reached or else new units and commands are
formed. The cadres commanding the new formations are
usually chosen from existing troop units. It is very
difficult to foresee in peacetime the exact dimensions
of the armed forces which may be needed to wage a war
throughout the entire period of its duration, since at
the very outset of the war mutual massive use of nuclear
weapons may fundamentally alter the situation.
Therefore, in accordance with the situation already
prevailing during the period of mobilization carried out
according to plans developed in peacetime, new forma-
tions may be created for the subsequent deployment of
the armed forces. However a considerable part
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of these formations can be realized administratively by
taking into account existing personnel and material
resources. [Ref. 141]
Mobilization plans for each service are different.
Forces like strategic rocket forces, troops of national
defense and some part of the air forces are in full equipped
and manned condition during the peacetime. The air trans-
portation units are to be supplied by Aeroflot (Soviet
Airlines) airplanes when necessary. The navy would reacti-
vate the mothballed ships, full supplying the ships would be
a main requirement as would manning. Since the deployed
warships maintain required combat personnel with adequate
logistic support, they would not need an initial mobiliza-
tion. Additionally, the navy would need to man mothball
ships with experienced navy personnelsome of whom might have
to be removed from currently deployed ships.
Most of the mobilized personnel would go to the ground
forces. The Soviet leadership should be able to mobilize 2
million to 3 million men in 24 hours. An equivalent number
again could be called up within 48 hours period, approxi-
mately doubling the regular peacetime force of between 4.5
million and 5 million men. This should give a total of
between 9 million and 11 million men in uniform within two
full days. Since in peacetime the Soviet Union has at least
9 million in the reserves who had military service within a
five-year period, the Soviet armed forces probably could
reach 13 million to 14 million in less than ten days, if
such numbers were needed. [Ref. 142]
Marshal Sokolovskiy divides the present day mobilization
process into four categories as is explained in the
following
:
With respect to methods and ways of realization, present
day mobilization of armed forces can be total or
special, open or concealed. Total mobilization is
declared by governmental decree and it is accomplished
openly ... Special mobilization in the past included
simultenous ly or consecutively only the territories of
certain military districts in the immediate vicinity of
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the probable theater of military operat ions ... The
concealed method was sometimes used for special mobili-
zations which consisted of mobilizing only certain units
under the guise of different types of checks, training
groups, maneuvers, etc... An important factor determining
the degree of preparation of the armed forces is the
system of recruitment in peacetime and during mobiliza-
tion. The most suitable system is assumed to be a system
of territorial recruitment of armies during mobiliza-
tion, which under conditions of nuclear rocket war
considerably accelerates the process of converting the
armies to a wartime organization. As for a peacetime
army, its main purpose --the immediate repulsion of an
aggressor and the preparation of trained manpower
reserves for war-- can be fulfilled only by using cadre
formations staffed on an extraterritorial basis.
[Ref. 143]
The Soviet armed forces are a synthesis of the overall
Soviet population and reflect every aspects of soviet
civilian society. Both are disciplined and ever controlled.
People are indoctrinated as if there will be immenient
attack to the Soviet Union by the West or the People's
Republic of China. With this never ending indoctrination
and a high share of GNP for defense, the Soviet Union is
considered a nation in arms. Due to what Soviet system
dictates politically, military issues are transformed to
what CPSU perceives and wants. The people are prepared for
war, starting at the early years of schooling.
B. CIVIL DEFENSE
The Soviet civil defense program adds important dimen-
sions to the preparation of the Soviet population for the
contingencies of war. The program is sufficiently well
developed, its further growth ensured by official firmness
and persistence, to give it substantial strategic signifi-
cance. It embraces the entire population and not just the
youth segment. Soviet authorities have had some difficulty
in getting mass cooperation with the civil defense programs
.
The widespread conviction that nuclear war means virtually
the end of the world, or at least is not subject to amelio-
ration by civil defense efforts, has bred cynical attitude
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toward civil defense training and added to the resistance
inevitable in a program that requires the sacrifice of indi-
vidual free time or, in the case of enterprise director and
his employees, of valuable production time. The authorities
now insist that civil defense propaganda and instruction
stress less the enormous damage that nuclear weapons can do
and stress more the ability of civil defense to protect the
population. [Ref. 144]
Marshal Sokolovskiy defines the primary tasks of civil
defense as following:
The principal tasks of civil defense are to ensure the
required conditions for normal activity of all govern-
mental control agencies during the course of war and the
effective functioning of the national economy. This is
achieved by maximum defense of the population against
the weapons of mass destruction, widespread and all-
round aid to victims, and the rapid removal of the
remains of an enemy nuclear attack. [Ref. 145]
Several new measures in recent years have further
revealed the importance that Soviet leaders attach to civil
defense. First, in 1971 Soviet civil defense training, which
formerly began in the fifth grade of primary schools, was
introduced in the second grade. The significance of this is
considerably increased by the fact that this measure was
undertaken despite widespread opposition by parents and
teachers. Second, civil defense research became mandatory
in technical and higher institutes of learning. Third, the
population has increasingly been incorporated into civil
defense formations, many of them specialized in various
functions, such as reconnaissance, rescue work, erecting
prefab and other emergency shelters, and predicting the
movement of radioactive clouds. Fourth, beginning in 1974,
an entire complex of changes took place in connection with
the civil defense systems for control, communication,
warning and technical equipping of units. Fifth, emphasis on
practical field training and exercises has increased
greatly. [Ref. 146]
122
Until 1961 civil defense in the Soviet Union was under
the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and was
known as MPVO , meaning "local air defense". In the summer of
1961 a number of changes took place in the Soviet defense
structure. Civil defense was reorganized at the national
level to become Civil Defense of the USSR and placed under
the Ministry of Defense. The underlying concept of the new
Soviet military doctrine adopted in 1960 was that "the armed
forces, the country, and the whole Soviet people must be
prepared for the eventuality of nuclear rocket war" . The
Moscow Military School for Civil Defense opened in 1967. One
of its three-year courses prepares officers for the mecha-
nized units of civil defense ; another prepares commanders of
subunits for anti-radiation and ant i- chemical protection; a
third course prepares officers as radio technicians.
[Ref. 147]
Military personnel assigned to civil defense are in two
separate categories. In the first category are those in
supervisory and administrative positions associated with the
"civilian" side of civil defense. These positions include a
chief of staff for civil defense, usually a general major,
in each of the fifteen republics of the Soviet Union; a
chief of staff in the grade of colonel or lieutenant colonel
in each autonomous republic, autonomous oblast (district),
or city over 100,000 in population; a civil defense military
chief in the 3,097 regions not part of cities and in 1,900
cities with populations of less than 100,000. Approximately
50,000 military personnel are assigned to civil defense
duties in this category of civil defense.
In the second category are deputy commanders for civil
defense within the headquarters of each of the sixteen mili-
tary districts of the Soviet Union, with their assigned
Troops for Civil Defense. The primary task of this portion
of civil defense is REscue and Urgent Disaster and
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Restoration Work (SNAVR). This includes locating and marking
areas of contamination; localizing and extinguished fires;
giving first aid to and evacuating the injured; removing the
people from disaster areas; disinfecting people and deconta-
minating clothing, transport, equipment, and so on. Such
work is carried on by both troop and non-military
unit s . Fragmentary evidence of troop organization leads to
the conclusion that there probably are as many as 50,000
troops assigned to civil defense in military units. This
force, combined with a military force of approximately
50,000 assigned to civil defense duties outside the formal
military establishments, suggests that at least 100,000
military personnel are engaged in civil defense duties of
some type. [Ref. 148]
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VII. CONCLUSION
There is no single measure of a nation's military capa-
bility. While the number of men under arms and mobilization
capability are major factors in evaluating military power,
these too can be offset by other less tangible considera-
tions. Among these are the quality of military leadership,
the professional competence of the officer corps, and the
technical skill of the troops. Other equally significant
factors are the national technical and scientific capa-
bility, industrial production potential, the government's
effectiveness and stability and, finally, that great impond-
erable, the national will. [Ref. 149]
Up to this chapter, many different areas of Soviet mili-
tary manpower have been examined. It was seen that Soviet
armed forces personnel face some problems which can affect
their performance in combat or in national emergency. On the
other hand intensive indoctrination of the overall popula-
tion and an over-centralized decision making process for
defense issues facilitate the preparation of the nation for
a future war. There is no doubt that Soviet armed forces
drawn from the Soviet people would fight to defend "Mother
Russia" as did its forebears, but in a future war, morale,
ethnic conflicts, strong pressure, and the other constraints
might help to offset the growing disadvantage in numbers of
weapons platforms that West faces. The following paragraphs




A. COMMAND STRUCTURE AND CONTROL
The Soviet system of command and control reflects
extreme centralization, with unquestioned control by the top
Party-military structure. But, centralized command structure
could fail within several hours after a nuclear attack
happens. Hence, Soviet military literature insists on
increasing the initiative capability of their officer corps.
Nevertheless, close control over combat troops and their
commanders is still exercised by top leaders of Soviet mili-
tary structure. Most of the Soviet leaders, either in the
Party or military, have been at the top levels of adminis-
tration for more than a decade. Many fought in World War II
and experienced major world crises. Also, they survived
different power struggles within the Soviet Union and dealt
with many complex international issues.
In the event of an international crisis that might lead
to military action, the Soviet leadership would be composed
of these men with a lot of experience in their position.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko and
Commander-in-Chief of Naval Forces Sergei Gorshkov are
typical examples of long term position holding in civil and
military administrations of Soviet Union.
The military district structure is advantageous for
mobilization and induction. Transforming to a military
theater in case of a war, this structure provides rapid
mobilization of the civilian population and fast reinforce-
ments to the troops already deployed. As a spinoff, this
system does provide a capability for internal controls that
would be of great significance in the event of a nuclear
attack.
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B. ETHNIC COMPOSITION AND RELATED PROBLEMS
One of the most significant aspects of Soviet forces
vulnerability is attributed to the ethnic and political
fragmentation. Both official and popular Western images of
the Soviet Union fail to recognize the multinational char-
acter of the Soviet state. Ethnic Russian domination of the
Communist Party contributes to the widely held perception
that "Russia" and the "Soviet Union" are synonymous
[Ref. 150].
At the present time, all nationalities are assigned to
ethnically integrated units. Personnel tend to be stationed
in parts of the country with which they have no ethnic or
religious identification. The Soviets seem to be making
every effort to russify their nationalities, and military
service plays an important role in this process.
Under Marxist -Leninism the solidarity of the working
class and economic prosperity were to have disposed of
narrower national and ethnic loyalties. But the ideologic
melting pot has failed to integrate the non-Russian peoples
except for the Belorussians , who are closely akin. The
apprehension that Russians feel toward other nationalities
is reflected in the Communist Party structure, state
bureaucracies, the armed forces, and the secret police. Each
is dominated by ethnic Russians including the large Soviet
Army where non-Russians are trusted in large numbers only in
construction or supporting units, and, even then, must serve
outside their native territories. Maintaining the empire
poses serious problems for Soviet foreign policy over the
long term. Challenges in Eastern Europe could eventually
spill over into neighboring Soviet republics. The Islamic
revolution in Iran could affect the loyalties of 40 million
Soviet Islamic citizens in Central Asia. If set in motion by
a major crisis, the pressures of nationalism could set all
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of the Soviets' ethnic dominoes falling out of control.
[Ref. 151]
The conclusion to be drawn from historical account of
Russian and Soviet policies and practices in using national-
ities in military is that when Slavs dominated the popula-
tion, leaders employed minority soldiers to defend the
country. In times of crisis, successive governments have
repeatedly created national units as a vehicle for mobi-
lizing more minorities in the war effort. Minority manpower,
in both national and regular units, appears to have been
helpful in certain vital instances, but overall minority
soldiers have been of questionable effectiveness, notably
unreliable, and sometimes completely disloyal. [Ref. 152]
Today's Soviet military management confronts various
problems which are caused by the ethnic composition of the
military manpower. There is an explicit discrimination
against minorities in their service selections and assign-
ments. This may cause unrest of minority groups as a result
of deliberate discrimination.
The ethnic related problems which face the Soviet mili-
tary are the language problem, ethnic-related alcohol and
drug abuse, religious issues affecting morale and soli-
darity, and nationality feelings and their effects on combat
readiness of troops.
The Russian language is the official language of the
armed forces. Intensive efforts have being made to improve
the number of Russian speaking people among the
non-Russians. Since most of the minorities go to Rear
Services such as construction units, they tend to speak
their own languages among each others. Although this is not
forbidden, Soviet officers do not want to see minority
personnel speaking in their ethnic languages. The main
reason to instruct all nationalities in the Russian language
is to facilitate their ability to function in a Russian
128
dominated society and to speed their acceptance of Russian
culture. This is also known as the Russif icat ion
.
Excessive consumption of liquor and other alcohol-based
substances in Soviet Army is primarily by Slavs. Baits are
reported to consume considerably less than the Slavs, and
the Muslim or Turkic peoples use no alcohol substances at
all. Alcoholic abuse among Slavs in the military can be
described as epidemic and its implications for military
efficiency are far reaching. [Ref. 153]
Narcotic abuse in the Soviet armed forces is distinctly
ethnic. Units with concentrations of Central Asians and
Muslim Caucasians are characterized by wide-spread use of
different kinds of narcotics indigenous to these areas.
[Ref. 154]
Religious feelings among servicemen of different nation-
alities are for the most part sublimated for fear of punish-
ment and abuse. Among ethnic Russians, religious expression
is said to be weakest, probably because there are propor-
tionately fewer real believers among them and because open
or semi-open expression of belief is easy to detect. For
Muslims and Baptists, the situation is considerably more
serious, and in both cases religious practice is closely
bound up with national consciousness and customs.
Ethnic groups assigned to construction units also work
in farms, and they produce meat and agricultural products
for army mess halls. The use of troops in these areas may
be advantageous from the standpoint of the economy's produc-
tivity, but should be taken into account in assessing the
military output of Soviet forces.
This issue could be serious when it comes to backing up
the Slav dominated troops in case of reinforcement.
Turkic-Muslim males will account for 28.7 percent of the
Soviet draft-age population in 1995, e.g. In contrast, the
percentage of ethnic Russians in the military is on the
129
decline. Soviet discriminatory practices raise the specter
that Soviet forces could suffer "severe 'second Battle'
weaknesses from having to replace early casualties to
Russian and Slavic forces with undertrained non-Slavic
soldiers" in an extended conflict [Ref. 155].
Internal political problems combined with current Soviet
economic problems will make it considerably more difficult
and possibly less attractive for Soviet leaders to project
their power abroad. These religious and nationalistic prac-
tices with fragile political base pose a real inside threat
for the Soviet military and all these factors could eventu-
ally impair the combat capability and readiness of Soviet
troops
.
C. MOBILIZATION AND RESERVES EFFECTIVENESS
The Soviet military services discharge almost two
million men into the reserves each year, giving that nation
a capability to mobilize millions of men with recent mili-
tary service in only a few days. The Soviet system of
reserve training helps ensure that many of those mobilized
in an emergency would be prepared immediately to perform
combat duties [Ref. 156]. The two year conscription period
might be inefficient in terms of training and specializing
on equipment , but the inductee has already had fundamental
military training and background long before he is inducted.
Moreover, Soviet weapons are relatively easier to use and
maintain compared to those of West. All these factors
increase the mobilization effectiveness.
D. TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION
The Soviets get some worthwhile results from their high-
pressure training system, but it would be a great error to
overlook the flaws in, and limitations of, a military system
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embeded in a society that not only fails to produce certain
important skills and habits, but creates others that are
seriously detrimental to military objectives. The heavy
investment in political indoctrination has negative effects
on attainable skill levels both by detracting from the time
available for skill training and by establishing political
priorities that reduce the skill return for the time that is
devoted to it. Negative repercussions on morale and conc-
ealed (and often open) evasion and resistance, with their
demoralizing effects, limit results achieved and impose
costs to effectiveness that are not easy to assess but are
clearly substantial. [Ref. 157]
As the Soviet literature indicates, DOSAAF, technical
schools, and higher military schools are faced with inade-
quate equipment which lags behind the current weaponry of
Soviet military, inferior teaching techniques, and anti-
quated teaching processes.
A variety of acknowledged operational difficulties and
frequent and severe criticism of the results of the training
and indoctrination raise doubts concerning the success of
Soviet efforts in the military training and operational
fields. The need to bend training and operational routines
to the exigencies of socialist competition leads to whole-
sale falsification of results in the military units and in
the cadet academies and reduces the value to commanders of
the otherwise valuable Soviet emphasis on constant testing
of military performance. Getting good marks is more impor-
tant than having a good unit. Good marks and operational
effectiveness are far from being highly correlated.
[Ref. 158]
Indoctrination of personnel who hold strategically
important positions such as strategic air force pilots,
personnel of nuclear missile silos and nuclear submarines,
poses some difficulties in terms of decision making process
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and pushing the buttons. Due to the nature of their jobs,
they do not see the real enemy in being and they are
entrusted with weapons having tremendous destructive power.
Since they cannot feel the combat situation's stress, it is
necessary to have a great force of will that cause them to
act. Inculcating this requires intensive and continuous
indoctrination.
Another problem that the Soviet military faces is that
most Soviet officers and NCOs did not serve in a real combat
situations, other than Afghanistan if we consider the Afghan
case as a real combat struggle. Soviet training and
emphasis on combat realism doubtfully could compensate for
combat inexperience.
The training and education practices of the Soviet armed
forces have potentially strong areas as well as weak areas.
As it is written, the 1968 Law for Universal Military
Service provides a very sound foundation on which to build a
strong armed forces. It provides for a steady supply of
manpower through conscription and trained reserve personnel.
Likewise, it is all encompassing and embraces the vast spec-
trum of military life for all men from the preinduction
through active duty, discharge into the reserves, reserve
training and retirement. The life- long military indoctrina-
tion of all Soviet people provides another source of trained
manpower. By the time an individual is inducted into the
armed forces, he will have spent several hundred hours in
military-patriotic training. Although this training has not
been of the quality demanded by the armed services , it has
the potential of developing into an extremely worthwhile and
effective training program. The vast and expansive officer
education system is another area which has tremendous poten-
tial. It begins indoctrinating an individual for military
life at the age of fifteen and continues throughout his
naval career. And this provides very strong love of country,
132
professionalism, and career opportunities to the young
officers
.
E. SELECTION AND PROMOTION
The effect of political criteria in the selection and
promotion of officers and non-commissioned cadres must
inevitably decrease the military effectiveness of units.
There is no reason to suppose that a high relationship
exists between military talents and a willingness and
ability to exhibit the behavior and attitudes agreeable to
Party officials and KGB informers although some correlation
probably exists since a good mind can serve both military
and career objectives.
F. OFFICER CORPS
In general terms, a Soviet officer is a specialist
rather than a generalist . He is taught on a theoretical
basis in military schools with little practicality. After
commissioning as an officer, more time is spent on practical
applications of what was taught before. It can be said that
first couple years become a secondary training period for
commissioned officers and that can cause deficiencies in
emergency cases.
Soviet spokesmen continually express the need for offi-
cers to develop initiative while at the same time initiative
is discouraged and penalized by the system.
In a carefully preplanned attack against an opponent,
some officers probably would perform satisfactorily. They
also could be expected to fight effectively and with all
possible means against any force invading Soviet territory.
But outside the Soviet Union, in a fluid situation with
communications to higher headquarters disrupted, most Soviet
officers probably would be at a loss.
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In contemporary military establishments reliability, and
consequently military effectiveness, depend to a consider-
able extent on the dedication and skill of a group of
highly trained relatively young officer-engineers or
of ficer^ technicians . In the Soviet Union, a non- trivial,
although not specifiable proportion, of such personnel are
reserve officers, many of whom resent their call to service,
do not view themselves as professional military men, and are
looking forward to their return to civilian life. Soviet
military writers have shown a particular sensitivity to
Western references to problems arising from the sense of
separation of the of ficer- technician from both commanders
and the political officers. [Ref. 159]
G. COMBAT READINESS
Although the Soviet military administration emphasizes
combat readiness, the Soviet training system cannot entirely
overcome periodic variations in operational effectiveness
caused by the reception of new recruits twice a year and the
reception of new junior officers from the cadet academies
that makes the autumn period especially difficult. All mili-
tary establishments with large numbers of draftees face
similar problems. They are magnified somewhat in the Soviet
Union by the twice yearly disruption of operational
routines, and by the early incorporation of the inductees
into operational units rather than into training regiments.
Combat readiness is particularly demanded in the stra-
tegic rocket forces and in the PVO and one is naturally led
to ask to what extent the operational efficiency of these
important services is affected by the Soviet induction and
training process. One way of reducing the negative impact on
operations caused by the periodic reception of draftees
would be to employ a large proportion of cadre in the rocket
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forces, in the PVO , in the nuclear submarine fleet. The high
proportion of first and second class specialists in these
services suggest a smaller number of recruits.
H. MAN MACHINE MIX
The demands for increasing the speed of the offensive
and combat readiness and mastering the most modern tech-
nology are leaving far less time to train soldiers and to
carry out tasks in war. Soviet military doctrine requires
that the main aims of a war be achieved in its initial
period without reliance on additional mobilization. There
is, therefore, an increasing volume of equipment on the
battlefield as equipment norms are raised and attained to
effect the required correlation of forces of main axes of
advance. This means that there can be no manpower slack to
absorb casualties in the event of war, as a standing army
will have to fight with, more or less only the men and
equipment it has in peacetime. Consequently, there can be
no immediate replacement for the technical specialist who is
a casualty. The other members of his team must cover for
him. But with present, highly technical equipment, this is
extremely difficult because it means that men must acquire
more than one complex specialty.
Due to both the power of modern weapons and the dynamism
of modern wars, the consequences of an individual's failure
can be very great--a radar operator's lack of vigilance can
lead to the enemy achieving a disastrous surprise air
attack. A short war involves a lack of times to gain combat
experience. [Ref. 160]
I. FINAL CONCLUSIONS
The Soviet armed forces play a significant role in
overall world politics. As a super power's armed forces they
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have tremendous military capabilities for strategic offense,
for deploying forces overseas, conducting short and swift
operations abroad, supporting and intervening Eastern bloc
countries, supplying arms and materiel to its allies all
over the world, strategic defense of the homeland, and
taking sides militarily in any kind of conflict. This
thesis has focused on the human dimensions of Soviet mili-
tary, but what has been written here can only approximate
reality and provide glimpses as to how the Soviet military
might perform in warfare. Only actual combat can provide the
true test of the Soviet soldiers' performance.
After dealing with the various aspects of Soviet mili-
tary manpower, we can summarize all issues which might be
perceived as potential shortcomings:
1. Problems related with military manpower supply and
composition of demographic structure seems to affect
ethnic structure of the current force levels in the
long run.
2. Ethnic related military management problems create
constraints on morale and psychology of the Soviet
soldier.
3. Language deficiency among the members of Soviet mili-
tary pose communication problems which might impair
the effectiveness of military organization and readi-
ness .
4. Although the command structure has advantegeous
aspects, over centralization and implicit restric-
tions on initiative of the officer corps could impair
combat effectiveness under surprise and emergency.
5. The increasing use of alcohol among military
personnel can be attributed to easy solution to short
and long term personal problems which might be the




6. Religious suppression of ethnic groups might cause
unpredictable social unrest and its reflections in
the armed forces might end with severe results.
7. Internal conflicts in some Warsaw Pact countries
might trigger social unrest in Soviet Union. This
unrest can probably be exacerbated by a relatively
fragile economy and the people who are in the search




The insufficient number of combat experienced
personnel can cause major operational problems in the
early periods of a future war.
9. The choice between quantity versus quality in
training and education still poses major problems
especially for the positions which require highly
skilled personnel who have to have theoretical as
well as practical knowledge.
10. Feelings of reserve officers toward the military
have negative effects on improving their expected use
in active military.
11. Emphasizing political indoctrination at the expense
of combat training may cause frustration to highly
professional military personnel.
12. Overemphasis on political reliability and party
activity for selection and promotion may cause unfair
and ineffective placements of incompetent personnel
in positions requiring traits rather than political
reliability
.
13. As long as the Soviet officer keeps his position as
a specialist, it might affect his leadership and
management skills.
All nations in the world are in the search of excel-
lence, combat readiness, deterrence and self confidence in
the levels of both military community and civilian
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community. As long as war exists, nations will spend much
financial sources on armament and preparation of personnel
who use them. There are always opportunity costs and sacri-
fice in the issues which relate to the weapons-man mix. One
might sacrifice the quality of personnel for the acquisi-
tion of a modern combat plane or the other might sacrifice
modern and expensive arms at the expense of personnel costs.
These are paradoxical and interacting decision making
choices
.
The Soviets seem to favor both. They emphasize personnel
as well as weapon systems. As explained in this thesis,
objective evaluation of Soviet military manpower with the
available Western and Soviet material cannot satisfy the
ability to conclude whether or not the Soviet military has
rightly answered this choice problem or whether they imple-
ment the right or wrong strategy on preparation of their
military personnel. But the Soviets do understand the impor-
tance of the human factor in military issues. They are
students of history, and as long as they are determined
enough not to forget past , they will emphasize on human
factor in order not to repeat past mistakes.
This thesis ends with the same citation with which it
began in order to emphasize that whatever level the tech-
nology, military art and military strategy can reach, the
final determinant will belong to the human factor.
"...of themselves, weapons and military equipment do not
determine the success of combat operations. What is impor-
tant is in whose hands they are. We know that man was and
remains the decisive force in war. Neither a missile, nor a
plane, nor a tank .... nothing is so formidable for the enemy
as a soldier who has high combat morale and military exper-
tise, who is capable of skillfully employing weapons and
equipment and using their combat properties to the full
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